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Warfare as Regulation 
Robert Knowles* 
Abstract 
The United States government’s national security activities, 
including the use of force, consume more than half of all federal 
discretionary spending and are carried out by the world’s largest 
bureaucracy. Yet existing scholarship treats these activities as 
conduct to be regulated, rather than as forms of regulatory action. 
This Article introduces a new paradigm for depicting what 
agencies involved in national security do. It posits that, like other 
agencies, the national security bureaucracy is best understood to 
be engaging in regulatory activity—by targeting, detaining, 
interrogating, and prosecuting enemies; patrolling the border; and 
conducting surveillance and covert actions. Also, like other 
agencies, this bureaucracy may overregulate—by using force or 
conducting surveillance more aggressively than necessary to 
achieve its objectives. 
This warfare-as-regulation paradigm offers several 
advantages over the predominant paradigm. It provides a cohesive 
explanatory framework for recent trends, including the 
individuation of targeting decisions, the infusion of legality into 
war-making, and widespread concern that national security 
decision-making favors aggressive policies and lacks sufficient 
transparency, accountability, and deliberation. Viewing warfare 
as regulation also helps reformers better identify the pathologies 
in the regulatory process and their true causes. 
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Using basic insights from public choice theory, and using the 
practice of targeted killing as a case study, this Article maps the 
power dynamics and bureaucratic incentives that drive national 
security regulating. It concludes that these dynamics and 
incentives systematically encourage overregulation. This Article 
then explores administrative law principles, institutional reforms, 
and new opportunities for political influence that may create 
countervailing anti-regulatory pressures.  
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I. Introduction 
This Article examines, for the first time, the U.S. 
government’s national security activities as a form of regulatory 
action.1 It focuses on the targeted killing process—specifically, 
the use of drones to kill members of armed groups in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen—as a 
case study for how bureaucrats regulate in the national security 
realm.2  
Like all U.S. national security endeavors, this targeting 
process is undertaken by the world’s largest bureaucracy.3 The 
                                                                                                     
 1. The term “national security” lacks a precise definition, but it seems to 
be an ever-expanding concept. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DOD DICTIONARY OF 
MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 162 (2017) (defining national security as 
encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States 
with the purpose of gaining a military or defense advantage over any foreign 
nation or group of nations, a favorable foreign relations position, or a defense 
posture capable of resisting hostile or destructive action); BARAK ORBACH, 
REGULATION: WHY AND HOW THE STATE REGULATES 2 (2013) (defining regulation 
as government intervention in the private domain); infra Part II (arguing that 
national security qualifies as regulatory action because most of its actions can 
be categorized as either rulemaking or adjudication). 
 2. See generally THE DRONE MEMOS: TARGETED KILLING, SECRECY, AND THE 
LAW (Jameel Jaffer ed., 2016) [hereinafter Jaffer] (detailing the U.S. 
government’s previously secret legal and policy documents concerning the 
targeted killing program); DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE: THE WAR ON 
TERROR AND THE SOUL OF THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY (2012) (describing the 
executive branch decision-making behind the escalation of the drone program). 
 3. See Niall McCarthy, The World’s Biggest Employers, FORBES (June 23, 
2015, 8:20 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2015/06/23/the-
worlds-biggest-employers-infographic/#3ae7382c51d0 (last visited Nov. 12, 
2017) (reporting that the U.S. Department of Defense was the largest employer 
in the world in 2015, with 3.2 million workers, followed by China’s People’s 
Liberation Army (2.3 million), Walmart (2.1 million), McDonald’s (1.9 million), 
and the U.K.’s National Health Service (1.7 million)) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
1956 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1953 (2017) 
U.S. national security state comprises the Departments of 
Defense, State, and Homeland Security, the National Security 
Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the 
National Security Agency (NSA), and more than a thousand other 
sub-agencies within them and in other departments.4 These 
agencies employ millions.5 Their activities account for more than 
half of all federal discretionary spending.6 
Yet the growing academic literature on the administration of 
national security activities largely treats them as conduct to be 
regulated, rather than as a form of regulation.7 For example, 
under the predominant paradigm, the drone bureaucracy is seen 
as a subject of regulation, rather than as an entity that regulates 
those affected by drone strikes.8 It seems natural, then, for critics 
                                                                                                     
 4. The Intelligence Community officially consists of seventeen 
organizations, but they have numerous agencies nested within them, and many 
other departments and agencies have intelligence-collection arms. See Members 
of the IC, OFF. DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-
we-do/members-of-the-ic (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (noting that the intelligence 
community is composed of two independent agencies, eight Department of 
Defense elements, and seven elements of other federal departments and 
agencies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); DANA PRIEST & 
WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW AMERICAN 
SECURITY STATE 86 (2011) (reporting that 1,074 federal government 
organizations and nearly 2,000 private companies work on programs related to 
counterterrorism, homeland security, and intelligence in at least 17,000 
locations across the United States).  
 5. See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, NATIONAL SECURITY AND DOUBLE 
GOVERNMENT 16 (2014) (observing that the total annual outlay for federal 
agencies engaged in national security is around $1 trillion and that those 
agencies employ millions). 
 6. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT’S 2017 
BUDGET 24 (2016) (reporting that the President’s 2017 budget allocated $610 
billion for defense discretionary spending and $564 billion for nondefense 
discretionary spending). 
 7. See infra notes 68–71 and accompanying text (explaining that legal 
scholarship assumes a distinction between domestic bureaucrats’ regulatory 
activities and the government’s war-making activities). 
 8. See Joshua Andresen, Putting Lethal Force on the Table: How Drones 
Change the Alternative Space of War and Counterterrorism, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. 
J. 426, 434 (2017) (suggesting that drones present unique legal challenges and 
require legal innovations to regulate them). See generally Andrew M. Anderson, 
Comment, Look, Up in the Sky!: Regulating Drone Use to Protect Our Safety and 
Privacy, 88 TEMP. L. REV. ONLINE 48 (2017) (arguing that precise legislation is 
necessary to regulate drone use to protect privacy).  
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of those activities to pitch reform proposals as attempts to 
regulate “the war machine,”9 instead of attempts to identify and 
correct errors in an existing regulatory system.10 Their proposals 
are aimed at striking that elusive balance between liberty and 
security.11 The difficulty is that, without a theory of how and why 
the national security bureaucracy regulates, these reform 
proposals do not engage with the biggest source of problems—
power dynamics, bureaucratic incentives, and the pathologies 
they cause.12  
This Article begins, in Part II, by offering an explanation for 
why modeling national security activities as regulation has not 
previously been attempted.13 Several factors—the perceived 
uniqueness of national security as an area of government activity 
and the nature of traditional warfare, in particular—contributed 
to scholars’ neglect of national security activities when exploring 
the regulatory behavior of agencies.14 
Next, in Part III, this Article explains why changes in the 
nature of warfare and the national security state’s modes and 
                                                                                                     
 9. See Part II.B (explaining how traditional modes of warfare fit uneasily 
with concepts of regulation); GILLES DELEUZE & FELIX GUATTARI, A THOUSAND 
PLATEAUS: CAPITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA 352 (Brian Massumi trans., 1987) 
(“[I]rreducible to the State apparatus . . . outside its sovereignty and prior to its 
law: it comes from elsewhere.”). 
 10. See infra notes 410–467 and accompanying text (describing the 
bureaucratic process of adding a nominee to the kill list). 
 11. See infra notes 187–196 and accompanying text (discussing factors 
unique to national security that make it difficult to measure the effectiveness 
and efficiency of national security regulation); Matthew C. Waxman, National 
Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289, 290 (2012) 
(stating that national security law scholarship focuses almost entirely on how 
the federal government balances liberty and security); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 38 
(2007) (performing analysis that weighs liberty losses against security gains). 
 12. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the domestic and foreign players 
connected to the drone bureaucracy); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building 
Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 925 (2005) 
(emphasizing that “predictions about the behavior of government institutions 
ought to rest on plausible accounts of the interests of individual officials who 
direct these institutions”). 
 13. See infra Part II (summarizing national security characteristics giving 
rise to the current paradigm and accounting for that paradigm’s persistence). 
 14. See infra notes 58–71 and accompanying text (describing the recent 
legal scholarship on national security regulation). 
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scope of activity have made a warfare-as-regulation model both 
viable and necessary.15 The expansion of national security 
activities into the domestic realm imposes more concentrated 
costs on U.S. citizens in the United States.16 In addition, the 
nature of warfare has fundamentally changed so that it routinely 
involves legal interpretation, rulemaking, and individualized 
determinations that are tantamount to adjudication.17 These 
activities are the meat and drink of regulating agencies.18  
It is time to embrace the reality that what looks, swims, and 
quacks like regulating is just that. The warfare-as-regulation 
paradigm is better suited for depicting the behavior of the 
national security state than the dominant regulated-war-machine 
paradigm.19 Moreover, by grounding national security activities 
firmly in the language, concepts, and theory of regulation, the 
warfare-as-regulation paradigm provides a cohesive explanatory 
framework for recent trends—including the individuation of 
detention and targeting decisions,20 the infusion of legality into 
war-making,21 and widespread concern that national security 
                                                                                                     
 15. See infra Part III (explaining the impact of globalization and the 
changing nature of warfare). 
 16. See infra notes 140–150 (describing domestic national security costs to 
U.S. citizens’ privacy). 
 17. See infra Part IV.A.2 (detailing the government’s process of identifying 
targets and procuring drones). 
 18. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (prescribing the process for 
notice-and-comment rulemaking); 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–557 (2012) (prescribing the 
process for agency adjudication); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 
(2001) (stating that adjudicating and notice-and-comment rulemaking are two 
major ways Congress delegates authority to agencies). 
 19. See infra Part III (discussing how factors that led to the current 
paradigm are becoming less important). 
 20. See infra Part III.A.2 (describing the individualized determination of 
targets as similar to agency adjudication processes); Samuel Issacharoff & 
Richard H. Pildes, Targeted Warfare: Individuating Enemy Responsibility, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1523 (2013) (observing the shift from the traditional war 
practice of defining an enemy by a group-based judgment to the current 
practice, requiring individuation of enemy responsibility before military force is 
justified). 
 21. See infra Part III.B (arguing that the warfare-as-regulation paradigm 
ensures better compliance with domestic and international law); Margo 
Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency’s Civil 
Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 112, 118 (2015) (arguing that intelligence 
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decision-making favors aggressive policies and lacks sufficient 
transparency, accountability, and deliberation.22  
Part IV introduces a warfare-as-regulation model for the 
specific context of targeted killing that also applies, with some 
variation, to other national security activities. In constructing a 
simple model, like much of administrative law literature on 
agency behavior, this Article relies on classic insights from public 
choice theory, which are contested.23 However, the evidence 
strongly suggests that, irrespective of bureaucratic incentives in 
domestic regulation, these classic insights are accurate regarding 
national security bureaucrats: they are motivated by zeal for the 
counterterrorism mission; they strive to maximize their agency’s 
budget, authority, and prestige; and, like domestic bureaucrats, 
they tend to overregulate concerning rare, high-profile risks.24  
In the targeted killing process, U.S. government agencies, 
supported by private firms, interpret and apply a set of 
substantive rules derived from international and domestic law as 
they develop intelligence, select targets, and carry out targeting 
operations.25 When these activities are viewed as a form of 
                                                                                                     
legalism is not effective in protecting individual liberties). 
 22. See infra Part III.B (suggesting that an accurate national security 
regulatory model effectively accomplishes risk management); Philip Alston, The 
CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 283, 284 
(2011) (noting that the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Department of 
Defense conduct significant extraterritorial targeted killings without 
accountability under domestic law or international obligations). 
 23. See RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 2 (Daniel 
A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010) (noting that public choice theory 
rests on assumptions that public actors behave rationally and act consistently to 
pursue particular objectives). 
 24. See infra Section III.D.1 (discussing incentives and traits of national 
security bureaucrats); GLENNON, supra note 5, at 26–28 (depicting national 
security bureaucrats as team players who are committed to the process rather 
than the outcome); STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD 
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 9–11 (1993) (describing domestic agencies’ 
tendency to overregulate high-profile, low probability risks). 
 25. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROCEDURES FOR APPROVING DIRECT ACTION 
AGAINST TERRORIST TARGETS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND AREAS OF 
ACTIVE HOSTILITIES 1 (2013) [hereinafter Drone Playbook] (prescribing 
procedures for approving targeted killing operations outside Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and Syria); Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO. 
L.J. 681, 701–33 (2014) (summarizing the bureaucratic process involved in 
certain types of targeted killing). See generally JEREMY SCAHILL, THE 
 
1960 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1953 (2017) 
regulation, that targeted killing bureaucracy resembles the 
fabled overreaching government agency of conservative 
nightmares in the 1970s and 80s—captured by a handful of 
public interest organizations and populated by empire-building, 
prestige-oriented bureaucrats who together drive the agency to 
overregulate without regard to the costs and long-term 
consequences.26 The difference is that the “public interest 
organizations” are, in this case, powerful military and 
intelligence contractors.27 
The bureaucrats’ incentives, and the lack of countervailing 
pressures, consistently push the national security bureaucracy 
toward overregulation.28 Under normal circumstances, in other 
words, that bureaucracy will use greater force or broader 
surveillance than necessary to efficiently achieve its objectives.29 
This Article then offers an account of how these bureaucratic 
incentives influence decision-making in the specific context of the 
targeting process.30 The national security bureaucracy maximizes 
                                                                                                     
ASSASSINATION COMPLEX: INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT’S SECRET DRONE WARFARE 
PROGRAM (2016) (offering, based on leaked documents and interviews, a more 
skeptical view of the process’s effectiveness at producing accurate intelligence, 
successfully eliminating enemies, and avoiding unnecessary civilian deaths and 
injuries). 
 26. See infra Part IV.D.1 (describing the development of public choice 
theory in the 1970s and 1980s); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, 
White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (1986) 
[hereinafter DeMuth & Ginsburg, White House Review] (depicting regulation as 
excessively cautious and favoring narrow groups instead of the general public); 
cf. Jaffer, supra note 2, at 9–10 (describing the formation of the targeted killing 
bureaucracy). 
 27. See LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: PRESERVING 
PUBLIC VALUES IN A WORLD OF PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS 118 (2011) 
[hereinafter DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE] (noting that, in the first 
eighteen months of the Bush administration, at least thirty-two top policy 
appointees were former executives, consultants, or major shareholders of top 
military contractors); ANDREW COCKBURN, KILL CHAIN: RISE OF THE HIGH-TECH 
ASSASSINS 49–50 (2015) (discussing how, following the Vietnam War, defense 
contractors mobilized support in Congress for various drone projects).  
 28. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 19 (“The resulting incentive structure 
encourages the exaggeration of existing threats . . . .”). 
 29. See id. (observing that the exaggeration of existing threats may also 
include creating new threats). 
 30. See infra Section IV.D.1 (explaining the incentives driving the national 
security bureaucracy).  
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agency prestige by producing enough targets to maintain the 
drone program’s primacy as a counterterrorism tool.31 In order to 
do so, it incentivizes the intelligence community and private 
contractors to supply targets.32 When strikes fail to kill an 
intended target, the agencies respond to this prestige threat by 
incentivizing the finding of intelligence to support a 
determination that those actually killed qualified as “enemies.”33 
The result is that, despite rigorous internal bureaucratic control 
mechanisms, the agencies involved in targeted killing will tend to 
overregulate—to launch too many strikes with inadequate 
intelligence, and to adopt overbroad assumptions that favor 
counting those killed as “enemies.”34  
Part V explores ways to compensate for the large imbalance 
in favor of overregulation in the targeting process specifically, 
and in the national security realm more generally. It offers no 
easy solutions.35 Because agencies in the national security state 
all generally share the same counterterrorism mission and 
bureaucratic incentives, institutional reforms that may be 
successful in the domestic context are unlikely to have the same 
effect in the national security context.36  
                                                                                                     
 31. See OFFICE OF DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, SUMMARY OF INFORMATION 
REGARDING U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM STRIKES OUTSIDE AREAS OF ACTIVE 
HOSTILITIES 1 (2016) (reporting between 2,372 to 2,581 combatant deaths by 
drone strike between Jan. 20, 2009 and Dec. 31, 2015). 
 32. See SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 71 (describing a former drone operator’s 
observation that there is an ever-increasing demand to add more targets to the 
kill list). 
 33. See infra notes 356–3369 (discussing the incentives for finding 
intelligence to support the “enemy” designation). 
 34. See, e.g., Jaffer, supra note 2, at 13–14 (offering evidence that the drone 
bureaucracy applied a presumption of combatant status if there was no evidence 
showing those killed were innocent bystanders); see also infra Section IV.D.1 
(discussing how bureaucrats’ incentives guide national security regulating). 
 35. See infra Part V (discussing the value of recognizing the strong 
pro-regulatory and weak anti-regulatory forces to help reformers correct the 
imbalance). 
 36. See infra Part V.A (describing the unique institutional reform 
considerations in the national security context); Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial 
Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 
271, 335 (2013) [hereinafter Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor 
Bias and the Department of Justice] (proposing re-assignment of some 
Department of Justice functions to other agencies with different institutional 
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Courts or truly independent quasi-judicial review bodies 
could help address the imbalance if they would apply 
administrative law principles that encourage and test agencies’ 
contemporaneous reason-giving.37 Although two scholars have 
previously proposed applying them in internal CIA procedures to 
increase accountability,38 this Article provides a different 
rationale for them—that their most important attributes are their 
anti-regulatory effects.39  
Finally, this Article identifies emerging opportunities to use 
political influence to alter bureaucratic incentives in the 
targeting process by focusing on the military contractors 
intimately involved in it.40 In particular, the rapid growth of the 
law enforcement and commercial drone market may create new 
cleavages between contractors seeking to expand into domestic 
markets and the bureaucrats they work with in the targeting 
process.41 If the public, U.S. and worldwide, becomes more aware 
of the costs of drone use, it could pressure the private firms, who 
in turn could pressure the bureaucrats to scale back the level of 
regulation.42 
                                                                                                     
missions as a means of blunting prosecutors’ incentives to over-regulate). 
 37. See infra Part V.B (asserting that establishing a judicial review 
mechanism can reduce the incentive to over-regulate); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 
318 U.S. 80, 94–95 (1943) (holding that agency decisions may be upheld by 
courts only on the grounds articulated by the agency during the decision-making 
process); Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE 
L.J. 952, 958–59 (2007) (arguing that Chenery, by prohibiting agencies from 
relying on post hoc rationales, promotes the core values of the nondelegation 
doctrine, assuring the agency has exercised judgment on an issue in the first 
instance). 
 38. See Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot 
Once: Higher Care for CIA-Targeted Killing, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1201, 1235 
(2011) (observing that U.S. administrative law, the “hard look” and Chenery 
doctrines in particular, are useful for “fleshing out” the procedures for reviewing 
CIA drone strikes). 
 39. See infra Part V (discussing the benefits of applying key administrative 
law principles to the national security context). 
 40. See COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 16–20 (explaining that contractors are 
intimately involved in nearly every stage of the targeting process); infra Part 
III.D.1 (discussing contractors’ incentives). 
 41. See infra Part V.C (discussing how firms experience a shift in 
incentives when supplying for commercial and private use).  
 42. See infra Part V.C (arguing that heightened public awareness of the 
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II. Two Paradigms of National Security Activities: The Regulated 
War Machine and the Regulating War Bureaucracy 
The term “regulation,” as I use it here, encompasses any 
“government intervention in the private domain,”43 but also 
extends to government activity designed to control the conduct of 
public entities as well.44 The types of regulation that receive the 
most attention are activities by agencies that impose a 
concentrated cost on a regulated subject.45 The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), for example, imposes caps on emissions, 
requiring polluters to spend money, either by producing less and 
forgoing profits, or by upgrading their equipment.46 The criminal 
justice system is made up of agencies—including police 
departments, sentencing commissions, and prosecutor’s offices—
                                                                                                     
costs of drone strikes increases political pressure to regulate). 
 43. See Barak Orbach, What Is Regulation?, 30 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 1, 
10 (2013) (discussing uncertain and contested definitions of “regulation” in 
American legal history). Compare Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. 
Ct. 2566, 2621–25 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (arguing that the power to regulate includes the power to compel 
activities), with id. at 2644 (joint dissent) (arguing that the phrase “to regulate” 
“can mean to direct the manner of something but not to direct that something 
come into being”). See generally ORBACH, supra note 1 (defining regulation as 
government intervention in the private domain). 
 44. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (2012) (defining “person” to include a public or 
private organization). 
 45. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 721 
(2005) [hereinafter Barkow, Administering Crime] (describing a typical agency 
regulation under which the subject of the regulation suffers a concentrated cost). 
Regulation should impose the concentrated costs on the entities that are 
externalizing them to society, forcing those entities to re-internalize the costs. 
See Victor B. Flatt, Should the Circle Be Unbroken?: A Review of the Hon. 
Stephen Breyer’s Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation, 
24 ENVTL. L. 1707, 1707 (1994) (book review) (“The goal is to internalize 
externalities so that everyone makes economically logical choices concerning 
their decisions and innocent persons are not unfairly burdened.”).  
 46. These costs may also be passed on to consumers. See Arnold W. Reitze, 
Jr., State and Federal Command-and-Control Regulation of Emissions from 
Fossil-Fuel Electric Power Generating Plants, 32 ENVTL. L. 369, 375–76 (2002) 
(noting that utility companies pass the costs of complying with environmental 
regulations directly to consumers or incorporate the costs into the base rate). 
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that regulate by restricting the public’s freedom and by arresting, 
fining, and incarcerating individuals.47  
Most significant agency regulatory activities fall into one of 
two categories—rulemaking or adjudication.48 Adjudication is an 
individualized determination based on specific facts; rulemaking, 
in contrast, is a proceeding, often involving broad participation by 
interested parties, that results in a policy of widespread 
application.49 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) defines 
both types of proceedings.50 But even activities that fall outside 
statutory definitions, or do not qualify as “agency action” at all,51 
can still generally be categorized as either rulemaking or 
adjudication.52 For example, the Social Security Administration 
                                                                                                     
 47. See Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. 
REV. 91, 91 (2016) (“Police agencies should be governed by the same 
administrative principles that govern other agencies.”); Barkow, Prosecutorial 
Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, supra note 36, 
at 273 (analyzing the Department of Justice as an agency that regulates 
corrections, clemency, and forensics); see also Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 
67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 810–11 (2015) (describing how agencies in immigration 
enforcement, public housing, licensing, and child protective services use arrest 
information as a regulatory tool). See generally Barkow, supra note 45 
(evaluating sentencing commissions as regulating agencies). 
 48. See Eric E. Johnson, Agencies and Science-Experiment Risk, 2016 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 527, 558 (2016) (“Based on the statutory attention lavished on 
[rulemaking and adjudication], it is clear that the APA sees these activities as 
the two most important modes of agency work.”); Christopher DeMuth, Can the 
Administrative State be Tamed?, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 121, 122 (2016) (observing 
that “regulation” also includes other activities, such as rule enforcement, 
licensing, and producing guidance documents).  
 49. See Johnson, supra note 48, at 558 (describing adjudication as the 
quasi-judicial and rulemaking as the quasi-legislative function of agencies); see 
also, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 
1540 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Where an agency’s task is to ‘adjudicate disputed facts in 
particular cases,’ an administrative determination is quasi-judicial. By contrast, 
rulemaking concerns policy judgments to be applied generally in cases that may 
arise in the future . . . .”). 
 50. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012) (“[R]ulemaking means agency process for 
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.”); 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (2012) 
(“[A]djudication means agency process for the formulation of an order.”). 
 51. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012) (“[A]gency action includes the whole or a 
part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial 
thereof, or failure to act.”). 
 52. See Sean Croston, It Means What It Says: Deciphering and Respecting 
the APA’s Definition of “Rule”, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 27, 40–42 (2013) (discussing 
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conducts rulemaking when it issues handbooks to its employees 
to guide them in the application of the agency’s regulations.53 And 
a police department engages in adjudication when an officer 
arrests a criminal suspect.54  
The U.S. government’s most significant national security 
activities also fit within the definition of regulation. Like agencies 
that regulate drug manufacturers or polluters, the national 
security state’s core mission is to limit risk—to provide safety to 
American society by imposing concentrated costs on potential or 
actual enemies and the public.55 And like criminal justice 
agencies, the national security state often imposes those costs 
through the application of coercive power directly upon 
individuals—both enemies and the public.56 
                                                                                                     
opinions in which courts have interpreted the APA’s definition of “rule” 
narrowly to exclude many rule-type determinations). 
 53. See Timothy H. Gray, Manual Override? Accardi, Skidmore, and the 
Legal Effect of the Social Security Administration’s Hallex Manual, 114 COLUM. 
L. REV. 949, 95051 (2014) (criticizing the reasoning and conclusion in Moore v. 
Apfel); see also Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
the SSA’s internal guidance manual “does not have the force and effect of 
law . . . [and] is not binding on the [agency]”).  
 54. See Jain, supra note 47, at 818 (observing that the decision to arrest a 
suspect is an individualized determination in which police officers or 
magistrates exercise broad delegated discretion in applying the probable cause 
standard to a specific set of facts); Slobogin, supra note 47, at 96 (“In 
administrative law parlance, the suspicion-based model of policing could be 
characterized as a form of ‘adjudication’ by the officer on the street.”). 
 55. See PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT 12 (2008) (arguing that most 
democracies today have evolved into “market states,” whose “strategic raison 
d’être . . . is the protection of civilians, not simply territory or national wealth or 
any particular dynasty, class, religion, or ideology”); BREYER, supra note 24, at 
910 (1993) (explaining that the regulatory system can be divided into two 
parts—“risk assessment,” and “risk management”); Emily Berman, Regulating 
Domestic Intelligence Collection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 6–7 (2014) 
(proposing that the risk-management literature be utilized to develop a more 
rights-protective approach to the regulation of domestic intelligence collection); 
Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rationalism in Regulation, 108 
MICH. L. REV. 877, 908 (2010) (“Contemporary regulation is concerned almost 
exclusively with the mitigation of risks . . . to human health and the 
environment; risks to the solvency of financial institutions; and risks from 
hazardous products, automobiles, workplace conditions, and so on.”). 
 56. See Slobogin, supra note 47, at 96 (comparing agency adjudication to 
the discretionary decision a police officer makes to “stop, arrest, or search 
someone”).  
1966 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1953 (2017) 
Moreover, when the national security state regulates, most of 
its actions fall within the general definition of either rulemaking 
or adjudication.57 The Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) engages in rulemaking when it prescribes 
security-screening measures for airline passengers.58 The NSA 
engages in rulemaking when it determines the parameters of 
search terms that will yield individuals’ private information for 
analysis.59 A combatant command conducts rulemaking when it 
formulates rules of engagement, which dictate when and how 
military personnel may use lethal force against an enemy.60 And 
the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) engages in 
adjudication when it vets and validates the “nomination” of an 
individual for the “kill list.”61 
Scholars and the general public have long recognized that the 
modern national security state consists of a vast, complex, and 
often-dysfunctional bureaucracy.62 But until recently, it was rare 
                                                                                                     
 57. This is obscured by the several ways in which the APA makes national 
security rulemaking and adjudication exempt from its procedural requirements. 
See, e.g., Robert Knowles, National Security Rulemaking, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
883, 904–05 (2014) (describing the national security exceptions). 
 58. See, e.g., Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 
Fed. Reg. 18,287-01 (Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540) 
(providing that the TSA may use “advanced imaging technology” to screen 
airline passengers). 
 59. See United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18: Legal Compliance 
and Minimization Procedures, NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY (July 22, 1993), 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/07-01.htm (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2017) (prescribing NSA rules for protecting constitutional rights of U.S. 
persons and the collection, processing, and dissemination of information 
concerning U.S. persons) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 5240.1-R, PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES 
OF DOD INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS THAT AFFECT UNITED STATES PERSONS (1982), 
http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodm/524001r.pdf 
(detailing the role of DOD personnel and resources in the NSA programs). 
 60. See, e.g., NATO INT’L SEC. ASSISTANCE FORCE, COMISAF’S TACTICAL 
DIRECTIVE (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.rs.nato.int/images/docs/20111105% 
20nuc%20tactical%20directive%20revision%204%20(releaseable%20version)%2
0r.pdf (prescribing directions for lowering civilian causalities in Afghanistan). 
 61. McNeal, supra note 25, at 728. 
 62. Criticism of the national security bureaucracy since the 1960s has 
emphasized its entanglement with the defense industry and members of 
Congress seeking federal largesse for their constituents. See, e.g., GORDON 
ADAMS, THE IRON TRIANGLE: THE POLITICS OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING 2426 
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for scholars to analyze the functioning of agencies within this 
bureaucracy.63 And the regulatory nature of that bureaucracy has 
received little-to-no attention.64 Debates about the proper scope 
and mode of federal regulation from the 1960s onward focused on 
domestic matters—economic regulation, such as the markets for 
air transportation and telecommunications; and quality of life, 
such as the workplace and the environment.65 When scholarly 
analysis touched on the government’s national security activities, 
it discussed how efficiently and effectively that bureaucracy 
delivers the service of national security rather than on how, in 
delivering this service, national security activities also regulate.66  
Since 9/11, legal scholars have paid more attention to the 
workings of the national security bureaucracy and the 
subsequent reorganization of many agencies involved in 
intelligence-gathering, homeland security, and immigration.67 As 
part of the broader debate about how national security laws and 
institutions can strike the correct balance between liberty and 
                                                                                                     
(1981) (asserting that key national security policy decisions are made by a close-
knit and exclusive group of federal bureaucrats, key members of Congress, and 
private business officials); see Yochai Benkler, A Public Accountability Defense 
for National Security Leakers and Whistleblowers, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 
288 (“‘National security’ is the system made up of state bureaucracies (the 
Pentagon, CIA, NSA, National Security Council (‘NSC’), etc.) and market 
bureaucracies (Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Booz Allen Hamilton, Halliburton).”).  
 63. See AMY ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, NSA, 
AND JCS 2 (1999) (“[E]xisting work in political science provides little help [in 
understanding national security agency interaction]. U.S. foreign policy 
agencies in general and national security agencies in particular have been 
vastly understudied in the discipline.”). 
 64. See John Yoo, Administration of War, 58 DUKE L.J. 2277, 2282 (2009) 
(“To the extent that administrative law scholars touched on the military, they 
have tended to focus on the question of delegated authority . . . .”). 
 65. Jerry Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and 
Rapprochement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW, 
supra note 23, at 24–26. 
 66. See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 18 (1971) (limiting the scope of his analysis of public bureaus to 
the services they provide, rather than their regulatory functions). In this highly 
influential work, Niskanen briefly suggested that military strategy was driven 
by demand and budget constraints. See generally id. at 76. 
 67. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2012)).  
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security,68 legal scholars began exploring the ways administrative 
law principles can or should be applied to the government’s 
national security activities.69 Relatedly, in the spirit of earlier 
analysis of domestic regulation, some scholars are beginning to 
draw on insights from public choice theory to consider which 
types of procedures and institutional designs are most effective in 
fighting terrorism.70 Deborah Pearlstein and Samuel Rascoff have 
separately observed family resemblances between the 
development of the national security bureaucracy and what 
Pearlstein calls the “broader administrative state.”71 
But legal scholars still hesitate to treat the national security 
state as a bureaucracy that regulates. They still draw sharp 
distinctions between the work civil bureaucrats do and the work 
                                                                                                     
 68. See Evan Fox-Decent & Evan J. Criddle, Interest-Balancing Vs. 
Fiduciary Duty: Two Models for National Security Law, 13 GERMAN L.J. 542, 
542 (2011) (“By all accounts, interest balancing has provided the primary model 
for making national security law and policy worldwide since September 11, 
2001.”). See generally POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 11. 
 69. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign 
Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1176 (2007) (applying Chevron to foreign 
relations law, both directly and by analogy); see Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar 
Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1233 (2007) 
(rejecting the presumptive application of Chevron deference to any executive 
interpretation in the foreign affairs context); Knowles, supra note 57, at 891 
(arguing for scaling back the scope of exceptions for national security 
rulemaking carved out in the APA); Radsan & Murphy, supra note 38, at 1235 
(observing that in U.S. Administrative Law, the “hard look” and Chenery 
doctrines in particular, are useful for “fleshing out” the procedures for ex-post 
review of CIA drone strikes); Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign Hard Look Review, 66 
ADMIN. L. REV. 489, 492 (2014) (proposing that foreign relations law be viewed 
“as akin to an area of domestic regulatory law” so that judicial review will 
involve the application of administrative law principles); Yoo, supra note 64, at 
2281 (“Administrative law scholarship has generally passed over the study of 
the military in favor of the domestic agencies.”). 
 70. See generally Samuel J. Rascoff, Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. 633, 705 (2016); Nathan Alexander Sales, Share and Share Alike: 
Intelligence Agencies and Information Sharing, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 279, 282 
(2010); Yoo, supra note 64, at 2283. 
 71. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier, the State, and the Separation of 
Powers, 90 TEX. L. REV. 797, 799 (2012) (“[T]he modern military in many ways 
enjoys the functional advantages, now long embraced, of administrative 
agencies.”); Rascoff, supra note 70, at 63738 (“[T]here is a lot to recommend the 
analogy between the intelligence apparatus and the administrative state . . . .”). 
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of “spies and soldiers,”72 and treat the government’s warmaking 
activities as a system separate from, if entangled with, the law.73 
Proposals to introduce more discipline, accountability, and 
deliberation into the targeted killing process, for example, are 
pitched as efforts to prevent officials from acting “with 
impunity,”74 “operating unchecked,”75 or “being issued a general 
hunting license.”76 When legal scholars refer to “regulating 
warfare,” they are interested in ways that the law can or should 
impose restrictions on the activities of the national security state, 
in the same way that government restricts the activities of 
individual citizens or firms.77  
In other words, the paradigm that dominates the legal and 
professional discourse is about the regulation of warmaking, not 
                                                                                                     
 72. David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA 
L. REV. 1359, 1374 (2007). 
 73. See Carla Crandall, If You Can’t Beat Them, Kill Them: Complex 
Adaptive Systems Theory and the Rise in Targeted Killing, 43 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 595, 598 (2013) [hereinafter Crandall, If You Can’t Beat Them, Kill Them: 
Complex Adaptive Systems Theory and the Rise in Targeted Killing] (describing 
the “nonlinear dynamic systems of warfare and national security law”). 
 74. See Carla Crandall, Ready . . . Fire . . . Aim! A Case for Applying 
American Due Process Principles Before Engaging in Drone Strikes, 24 FLA. J. 
INT’L L. 55, 58 (2012) (arguing that due process requires the establishment of 
“review tribunals” comparable to Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs)). 
 75. See Toren G. Evers-Mushovic & Michael Hughes, Rules for When There 
Are No Rules: Examining the Legality of Putting American Terrorists in the 
Crosshairs Abroad, 18 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 157, 15960, 17982 (2012) 
(proposing presidential sign-off on all targeted killings of Americans and 
independent ex-post investigation that reports to Congress). 
 76. Radsan & Murphy, supra note 38, at 1209. 
 77. See id. at 1232 (analogizing military operations during traditional wars 
to the actions of private citizens, whose typical decisions are not subject to 
official scrutiny unless “the relevant authorities . . . have grounds for believing a 
serious violation has occurred”); Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Daniel 
Hessel, Julia Shu & Sarah Weiner, Consent Is Not Enough: Why States Must 
Respect the Intensity Threshold in Transnational Conflict, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
17 (2016) (“[Jus ad bellum rules] create a potential loophole in the legal 
regulation of the use of military force that could leave consent-based 
interventions dangerously under-regulated.”); McNeal, supra note 25, at 781–83 
(describing the process of targeted killing as being carried out by a bureaucracy 
and discussing internal and external control mechanisms); Sales, supra note 70, 
at 28283 (analogizing intelligence-collection agencies to private firms). But cf. 
Rascoff, supra note 70, at 662 (describing how the telecommunications industry 
“has now taken a stance against ‘overregulation’ by the intelligence state”). 
1970 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1953 (2017) 
about warmaking as regulation. Although I focus here on one 
mode of warfare, the analytical problems I discuss generally 
apply to the whole panoply of national security activities, 
including surveillance, covert action, border control, and foreign 
affairs. I call this dominant paradigm the regulated-war-machine. 
Below, I discuss reasons why this paradigm came to dominate 
and why it persists. I then explain why it falls short in accurately 
modeling today’s national security regulatory activities.  
A. The Conceptual Difficulty 
The American public, the Congress, and the courts are 
accustomed to treating national security as a unique and 
separate sphere of government activity.78 Areas like health care 
and banking, for example, saw fierce debates on the propriety of 
government intervention in the private marketplace.79 But 
national security was the first, and is the essential, government 
function, necessary to the very existence of society and the 
state.80 Government is, if nothing else, the entity with a monopoly 
on the use of force.81 Americans never debated whether the U.S. 
government should conduct national security activities at all—it 
always has and it always will.82  
                                                                                                     
 78. See generally Crandall, supra note 73. 
 79. See, e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE 
POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 153205 (1992) 
(describing failed Nineteenth Century efforts to centralize federal government 
functions in a health and welfare ministry). See generally JAMES WILLARD 
HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (2010) (describing the rise 
of market regulation in the U.S.). 
 80. See Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 
YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 390 (2006) (“Probably no function of government is deemed 
more quintessentially a ‘state’ function than the military protection of the state 
itself . . . .”). 
 81. See id. (arguing that privatizing military functions could “threaten” the 
government’s “existence” by reducing its control of the use of force); Kristen 
Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity, 95 TEX. L. REV. 467, 475 (2017) 
(observing that crime control, foreign policy, and national defense closely relate 
“to the modern understanding that the state’s function is to monopolize the 
legitimate use of force within a territory and to protect its citizens from both 
internal and external threats”). 
 82. See DELEUZE & GUATTARI, supra note 9, at 35254 (theorizing that the 
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Because the private realm could not exist or survive without 
national security, it is difficult to conceptualize national security 
activities as intervening in that private realm. Instead, it has 
been easier to conceptualize other public entities—legal 
frameworks including international law, the Congress, the courts, 
internal oversight organizations—as intervening to correct errors 
in the functioning of an ever-present war machine.83 
B. The Nature of Traditional Warfare 
Moreover, the regulated-war-machine paradigm has 
dominated because the nature of traditional warfare made 
national security activities an uneasy fit with common notions of 
what regulation is.84 Most forms of domestic regulation are 
observable, concern matters accessible to the trained professional 
in the field, involve public participation, govern activities inside 
the United States, and impose concentrated costs primarily on 
U.S. citizens and corporations.85  
Traditional warfare was, in several fundamental respects, 
just the opposite. First, it was difficult to conceive of traditional 
warfare as government intervention in the private domain.86 
Traditional warfare was primarily “characterized by amassed 
armies on pitched battlefields” or “tank battalions maneuvering 
to break through enemy lines.”87 The goal of warfare has always 
                                                                                                     
“war machine” preceded the existence of government and has been co-opted by 
it). 
 83. See id. at 354 (arguing that it is necessary to conceptualize the “war 
machine” as something different and separate from the “State apparatus”). 
 84. See id. at 352 (“As for the war machine in itself, it seems to be 
irreducible to the State apparatus, to be outside its sovereignty and prior to its 
law: it comes from elsewhere.”). 
 85. See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass 
Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 
174 (1997) (“[U.S.] Administrative law has somewhat of a fetish for public 
participation in agency decision-making.”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, From 
Smokestack to SUV: The Individual As Regulated Entity in the New Era of 
Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 523–33 (2004) (describing the forms 
and processes of domestic environmental regulation). 
 86. See generally Crandall, supra note 73. 
 87. GANESH SITARAMAN, THE COUNTERINSURGENT’S CONSTITUTION: LAW IN 
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been to destroy the enemy’s capacity or will to fight.88 
Traditionally, this was accomplished through “kill-capture”—
destroy the enemy’s capacity by killing or capturing a sufficient 
number of its soldiers and neutralizing its weaponry.89 The enemy 
was identifiable: the distinction between uniformed combatants 
and non-combatants was usually easy to draw.90 This type of 
warfare does not resemble regulation—i.e., government 
intervention in the private domain—so much as multiple 
governments struggling for dominance.  
By the Twentieth Century, with the rise of air power, “total 
war” became the objective—“smashing the material and moral 
resources of a people . . . until the final collapse of all social 
organization.”91 The principles of international humanitarian law 
developed in response, intended to constrain the destructiveness 
of the war machines and prevent extreme suffering.92 But this 
development only reinforced assumptions that warfare was a 
phenomenon to be regulated. The practice of total war, although 
it involves the private realm and is regulated by law, seems alien 
to the concept of regulation—total war is annihilation, not 
intervention.93  
                                                                                                     
THE AGE OF SMALL WARS 3 (2012). 
 88. See id. at 23 (“Though killing and capturing does take place, it is not 
the primary goal . . . .”). 
 89. Id. at 3233. 
 90. See id. at 36 (explaining that a key difference between the approaches 
required of the counterinsurgent and the “conventional warrior” is that enemy 
combatants are now “embedded in the local community”).  
 91. See WILLIAM C. MARTEL, VICTORY IN WAR: FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN 
MILITARY POLICY 71 (2006) (quoting Italian military strategist Giulio Douhet). 
 92.  See SITARAMAN, supra note 87, at 44 (explaining that the humanitarian 
principle to not attack civilians developed from a “shift in military strategy”); 
Eyal Benvenisti & Amichai Cohen, War Is Governance: Explaining the Logic of 
the Laws of War from A Principal-Agent Perspective, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 
1367 (2014) (“Modern militaries and their civilian leaderships need IHL—
indeed, a kind of IHL that is specifically tailored to control the agents—because 
they collectively face a daunting challenge of controlling their respective troops, 
whose interests may diverge from their own.”). 
 93. See MARTEL, supra note 91, at 71 (“‘War must be total because the 
decision,’ according to Douhet, ‘must depend upon smashing the material and 
moral resources of a people . . . until the final collapse of all social 
organization.’”). 
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Second, traditional warfare, and national security activities 
more generally, have always involved a great deal of secrecy.94 
This aspect has only become more pronounced over time. By 
2009, 1,074 U.S. government organizations worked on programs 
at the top-secret level alone.95 The number of agencies and 
employees working on merely “secret” level programs is surely 
much larger.96 Secret government activities, by their very nature, 
cannot involve the broad participation and corresponding 
accountability—either to the public or Congress—that we expect 
from regulatory activities.97 
Third, military experts with unique expertise carried out 
traditional warfare with scant public consultation.98 It is a 
well-established legal trope that even the most complex and 
technically obscure domestic regulatory subject is more 
comprehensible to outside observers, and susceptible to 
second-guessing, than foreign relations and national security 
matters.99 Many modern developments—such as the end of 
                                                                                                     
 94. See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
5974 (1998) (tracing secrecy in the context of warfare from World War I to the 
Cold War). See generally, GEOFFREY R. STONE, TOP SECRET: WHEN OUR 
GOVERNMENT KEEPS US IN THE DARK chs. 1–3 (2007). 
 95. PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 4, at 86.  
 96. See id. at 8687 (describing the expansion of government organizations 
at the secret level post-9/11). 
 97.  See Jonathan Hafetz, A Problem of Standards?: Another Perspective on 
Secret Law, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2141, 2144 (2016) (“In some instances, the 
debate over secret law . . . [focuses on] executive branch efforts to treat 
congressional delegations as invitations to develop broad and malleable 
standards that provide sufficient elasticity to respond to heterogeneous, often 
rapidly developing events.”); Knowles, supra note 57, at 885–87 (explaining that 
secret national security rulemaking does not undergo traditional APA 
notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
 98. See Pearlstein, supra note 71, at 84950 (commenting on the growing 
differences between civilians and the military). 
 99. See ZEGART, supra note 63, at 27 (“Whereas domestic policy is fairly out 
in the open, much of national security agency activity is conducted in secret.”); 
Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 
1366–85 (2009) (describing how courts defer to the executive branch’s factual 
national security assertions in different contexts); Anjali S. Dalal, Shadow 
Administrative Constitutionalism and the Creation of Surveillance Culture, 2014 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 61, 71 (2014) (describing the lack of guidelines governing the 
FBI’s conduct under J. Edgar Hoover); Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or A 
Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 
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conscription in the U.S., the professionalization of the military,100 
and the dominance of technology in warfare—have widened the 
military-civilian divide101 and enhanced the perceived uniqueness 
of national security expertise. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the United States 
waged traditional warfare almost exclusively abroad, and its 
most concentrated costs were imposed on foreign citizens and 
property.102 In other words, the U.S. government regulates foreign 
citizens through its extraterritorial national security activities, 
yet that concept is difficult to reconcile with theories of regulation 
that justify government intervention in the private realm on 
some version of a social contract model.103  
C. Vague Grants of National Security Authority 
These aspects of traditional warfare and the 
regulated-war-machine paradigm they have inspired are reflected 
in the post-World War II institutional design of the national 
security state.104 Congress exempted much of the state’s 
                                                                                                     
444 (2005) (analyzing “courts’ deference to the Executive’s wartime factual 
determinations” and how this has “short-circuited the process of judicial 
review”). Cf. Shirin Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes in National Security, 129 HARV. 
L. REV. 1566, 1568 (2016) (discussing the constitutionality of the “reasonable 
suspicion” threshold for adding individuals to terrorist watch lists). 
 100. See Pearlstein, supra note 71, at 84950 (describing the transition from 
the “citizen-soldier” to a professionalized military). 
 101. Id.; see DIANE H. MAZUR, A MORE PERFECT MILITARY: HOW THE 
CONSTITUTION CAN MAKE OUR MILITARY STRONGER 76–77 (2010) (discussing how 
the military has become more politically partisan); THOMAS E. RICKS, MAKING 
THE CORPS 23 (1997) (describing a military that has become “Republicanized” 
and features officers who “seem to look down on American society in a way that 
the pre-World War II military didn’t”).  
 102. See Ruth Grant & Robert Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power 
in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 39 (2005) (observing that, because 
the United States primarily conducts warfare abroad, its reputation is insulated 
at home). 
 103. See id. at 34 (“On the global level, there is no public that can . . . ground 
the justification for accountability mechanisms of a democratic type.”).  
 104. See DOUGLAS T. STUART, CREATING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE: A 
HISTORY OF THE LAW THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 11011 (2008) (describing how 
the U.S. government’s organizational failures prior to, and during, World War II 
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regulatory activity from the APA’s procedural requirements.105 
While the organic statutes establishing domestic agencies such as 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the SEC, and 
the EPA defined agencies’ missions in broad terms, the National 
Security Act of 1947 is the most vague organic statute of them all, 
vesting the CIA, the NSA, and the NSC with little more than 
simple mandates to gather intelligence for the purpose of 
protecting national security.106 The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), which has long conducted a substantial 
portion of national security activities, has had no statutory 
mandate to do so for most of its history.107 These agencies 
operated with minimal oversight until the 1970s, when Congress 
finally began to intervene to regulate intelligence collection.108 
Moreover, when the national security state engages in the 
use of force, the source and scope of its mandate to do so has 
typically been even murkier.109 The President may order the use 
                                                                                                     
influenced the design of the National Security Act). See ZEGART, supra note 63, 
at 1719 (providing an overview of the new institutionalism theory of 
bureaucracy). 
 105. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2012) (stating that notice-and-comment 
requirements apply to rulemaking “except to the extent that there is involved a 
military or foreign affairs function of the United States”); see Knowles, supra 
note 57, at 919–32 (discussing the legislative history of, and historical context 
for, the APA’s national security exceptions); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian 
Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2009) (describing “black and 
gray holes” in Administrative Law that enable Executive discretion during 
emergencies). 
 106. See Rascoff, supra note 70, at 699 (“[A]lthough Congress initially 
regulated the intelligence community with an exceedingly light touch—the 
CIA’s organic law is breathtakingly short on detail . . . .”). 
 107. See id. at 700 (“[T]he FBI lacks a basic legislative charter 
altogether . . . .”); Dalal, supra note 99, at 7071 (“[T]he FBI gradually expanded 
its mission from strictly federal law enforcement, to domestic intelligence 
gathering for wartime national security, and finally to domestic intelligence 
gathering to preserve social and political order within the United States.”).  
 108. Zachary K. Goldman and Samuel J. Rascoff, Introduction—The New 
Intelligence Oversight, in GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT xvii, xvii (Zachary K. 
Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff eds., 2015). 
 109. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jean Galbraith, Presidential War Powers As an 
Interactive Dynamic: International Law, Domestic Law, and Practice-Based 
Legal Change, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 689, 693 (2016) (observing that the interrelated 
development of the international and domestic legal regimes governing the use 
of force has been practice-based). 
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of force in some circumstances without specific statutory 
authorization and with minimal congressional involvement.110 
Even when Congress explicitly authorizes the use of military 
force by statute, it typically grants authority in broad, vague 
terms.111 The Uniform Code of Military Justice, with certain 
important exceptions, focuses on the internal governance of the 
military bureaucracy, rather than the ways in which the military 
uses force.112 In general, the national security bureaucracy has 
enormous discretion to regulate with the use of force as it sees fit, 
so long as it complies with the President’s relevant orders and its 
own interpretations of international law.113 
As Professor Jonathan Hafetz has observed, the national 
security bureaucracy takes these vague grants of authority as 
“invitations to develop broad and malleable standards” and “strip 
rules of their ordinary meaning, causing their sub rosa 
transformation into standards.”114 Unlike rules and standards in 
other areas, where agency interpretations are regularly subject to 
judicial interpretation and other forms of external scrutiny, 
national security delegations of authority “resist 
particularization” and tend to expand over time.115 
Because “much of the study of administrative law has 
focused on formal authority, at the expense of actual or effective 
                                                                                                     
 110. See id. at 691 (“Even though the Constitution assigns to Congress the 
power to declare war, as well as a variety of other powers relating to war, 
presidents have on numerous occasions initiated the use of military force 
without obtaining specific congressional authorization.”). 
 111. See Scott M. Sullivan, Interpreting Force Authorization, 43 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 241, 242 (2015) (“They [AUMFs] explode into the legal landscape with 
supernova intensity, briefly outshine the broader legal constellation and, at 
their birth, are bound only by the functional concerns surrounding armed 
conflict.”).  
 112. See McNeal, supra note 25, at 761 (detailing how accountability and 
punishment operate under the Uniform Code of Military Justice). 
 113. See id. at 763 (“The process [of targeted killing] is unaccountable 
because the killings are beyond the reach of courts, making Executive Branch 
officials ‘judge, jury[,] and executioner.’”). 
 114. Hafetz, supra note 97, at 2144. 
 115. Id.; see also Dalal, supra note 99, at 132 (remarking that scholars have 
cautioned about the growing power of unfettered executive discretion in matters 
of national security). 
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power,”116 such malleable and expanding grants of formal 
authority contributed to administrative law scholars neglecting 
the national security bureaucracy. In addition, because 
Congress’s more recent specific statutory interventions, since 
FISA, sought to either expand or restrain existing discretion,117 it 
was natural for legal scholars to focus on how external 
constraints might limit agency discretion in the national security 
realm, rather than the equally important question of how and 
why that discretion is empowered and constituted.118 In other 
words, administrative law scholarship has been working almost 
exclusively within the regulated-war-machine paradigm. 
D. The Structure of the National Security Bureaucracy 
Two unusual structural features of the national security 
bureaucracy also make the regulated-war-machine paradigm 
initially attractive. The first feature is that bureaucracy’s sheer 
size and complexity. No other area of government activity is 
populated by so many nested agencies with intricate 
relationships of authority.119 The Director of National Intelligence 
                                                                                                     
 116. Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 215 (2015). 
 117. See, e.g., USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 11423, 129 Stat. 
268 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (2012)) (imposing some new limits on the bulk 
collection of telecommunication metadata on U.S. citizens by American 
intelligence agencies); 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (2012) (lowering the standard for 
obtaining internet metadata so that the FBI need only certify to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) that the information likely to be obtained 
is “relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international 
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities”); 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012) (the 
so-called “business records” provision); 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (2012) (allowing the 
government to acquire foreign intelligence by obtaining the content of 
communications by non-U.S. persons “reasonably believed” to be outside U.S. 
borders, and interpreted to authorize the collection of phone and Internet 
content of Americans in the process). 
 118. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law 
in the Gilded Age, 119 YALE L.J. 1362, 1470 (2010) (“Forgetting that 
administrative law both constitutes and empowers administrative action at the 
same time that it structures and constrains administrative behavior, 
administrative law is often thought of as just that set of external constraints 
that limit agency discretion.”). 
 119. See LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COSTS OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, 
POLITICS, AND LIBERTY 11 (2008) (explaining the expansion of the executive’s 
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(DNI), for example, is the titular “head” of the intelligence 
community and responsible for coordinating intelligence 
gathering across hundreds of agencies.120 However, the DNI 
possesses little actual authority to control those agencies.121 The 
fragmenting of authority frustrates oversight and public 
participation in these agencies’ activities.122 
The second unusual feature of the national security 
bureaucracy is the proliferation of mandates with a high degree 
of overlap—so many agencies and sub-agencies tasked with 
accomplishing the same or similar missions.123 This overlap 
creates a close-knit bureaucratic environment prone to both 
unusually intense agency competition and unusually frequent 
opportunities for close cooperation when agencies’ immediate 
goals align.124  
These features make the national security bureaucracy 
resemble, in some ways, a marketplace.125 Indeed, a fruitful 
                                                                                                     
authority regarding issues of national security and counterterrorism). See 
generally Jean Tirole, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion 
in Organizations, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181 (1986) (describing different types of 
bureaucratic structures). 
 120. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-458, § 1011, 118 Stat. 3638 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1)(a) (2012)). 
 121. See John D. Negroponte & Edward M. Wittenstein, Urgency, 
Opportunity, and Frustration: Implementing the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 379, 388 (2010) (“[The 
IRPTA is] a consensus piece of legislation that created a DNI position with 
broad responsibilities but only vague authorities in critical respects.”). 
 122. See DICKINSON, supra note 27, at 107 (observing that outsourcing 
“significantly worsens” these problems). 
 123. See ZEGART, supra note 63, at 23 (“Whereas domestic policy agencies 
tend to have discrete jurisdictions, foreign policy agencies intersect, overlap, and 
interact.”). 
 124. See id. at 37 (“[N]ational security agencies live in a much more tightly 
knit, stable bureaucratic world than their domestic policy counterparts.”); Sales, 
supra note 70, at 28586 (explaining how the “wall” between intelligence 
officials and criminal investigations demonstrates why administrative agencies 
do not readily share information with one another). 
 125. The classic model of a market is a decentralized, atomistic process in 
which individual firms conduct innumerable transactions to produce, in the 
aggregate, an inadvertent social result. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT 
ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
98 (1994). However, actual markets may have small numbers of firms with 
long-term relationships who conduct transactions intending a particular 
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branch of recent administrative law scholarship has zeroed in on 
the ways agencies (both inside and outside the national security 
state) interact.126 These analyses often use market models to 
depict agency behavior—reinforcing the influence of the 
regulated-war-machine paradigm. 
E. Limited Judicial Review 
Another significant reason for the dominance of the 
regulated-war-machine paradigm is the limited role of the courts 
in national security matters. Legal analysts have typically begun 
examining regulatory action by agencies where it is most 
accessible—through the lens of judicial review.127 But largely for 
the reasons discussed above, U.S. courts have historically been 
reluctant to review the government’s national security 
activities.128 Courts have relied on several doctrines—political 
question,129 standing,130 immunity,131 and the state secrets 
                                                                                                     
aggregate result. Id. at 99; see Sales, supra note 70, at 282–83 (analogizing 
national security agency actions to private firms protecting trade secrets). 
 126. See, e.g., Sales, supra note 70, at 28283 (describing the various 
“analytical frameworks” through which administrative law scholars are 
studying agency actions with regard to information “hoarding”); see Renan, 
supra note 116, at 213 (“Through pooling, the executive augments capacity by 
mixing and matching resources dispersed across the bureaucracy.”); Eric Biber, 
The More the Merrier: Multiple Agencies and the Future of Administrative Law 
Scholarship, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 78, 7883 (2012) (examining the new focus on 
agency interactions in administrative law scholarship). 
 127. See Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudenceat OIRA and 
Beyond, 103 GEO. L.J. 259, 26162 (2015) (observing that OIRA is not subject to 
judicial review). 
 128. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 
329 (1936) (prescribing exceptional deference to executive branch claims in 
foreign affairs); see Chesney, supra note 99, at 1362 (discussing the weight of 
“factual deference” in national security claims); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of 
Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 
1099–101 (2008) (describing exceptional national security deference); Vermeule, 
supra note 105, at 1097 (describing the ways in which courts scale back scrutiny 
during emergencies). But see Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The 
Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1901 (2015) 
(arguing that this form of exceptionalism is fading). 
 129. See Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 
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privilege,132 among others—to avoid reviewing exercises of agency 
discretion. When courts have engaged in review, they typically 
have given exceptional deference to the national security state on 
matters of both fact and law.133 
These factors—the fundamental necessity of national 
security activities, the nature of traditional warfare, vague 
mandates, and judicial deference—have not operated in isolation. 
They are mutually reinforcing, which makes national security 
regulatory activities seem especially difficult to depict and 
analyze. For example, Congress, with modes of traditional 
warfare in mind, gives agencies conducting national security 
activities broad and vague mandates, while also exempting those 
activities from the procedural requirements imposed on the rest 
of the administrative state.134 The national security bureaucracy, 
operating in secret and not burdened by the APA’s procedural 
requirements—which were designed to ensure deliberation and 
public participation in regulatory activities—need not, and does 
not, produce a record suitable for meaningful judicial review.135 
                                                                                                     
941, 941 (2004) (“This Article attempts to explain and justify the exceptional 
treatment that courts accord foreign affairs issues under the political question 
doctrine.”). 
 130. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 402 (2013) (holding that a 
group of U.S. reporters, attorneys, activists, and workers lacked standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)). 
 131. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Rights Without Remedies: The Newfound 
National Security Exception to Bivens, 28 A.B.A. NAT’L SEC. L. REP. 1, 4 (2006) 
(“[B]ecause of the qualified immunity doctrine, federal officers are seldom held 
directly liable even where courts do find a Bivens remedy.”).  
 132. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1093 
(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (dismissing, under the state secrets doctrine, foreign 
nationals’ claims of harm caused by the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program). 
 133. See Chesney, supra note 99, at 136685 (detailing numerous instances 
of national security fact deference in judicial decisions post-9/11); Eskridge & 
Baer, supra note 128, at 1099101 (cataloguing the Supreme Court’s various 
deference regimes); Vermeule, supra note 105, at 109899 (arguing for greater 
examination of the lower federal courts’ showing deference to administrative 
agency action pertaining to national security matters post-9/11).  
 134. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (contemplating what 
“effective accountability” measures would look like that increase participation 
and transparency).  
 135. See Stephen F. Williams, “Hybrid Rulemaking” Under the 
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The courts, without clear statutory principles against which to 
evaluate the legality of agency action or a useful record, and 
believing in the unique expertise of national security 
bureaucrats, shy away from reviewing agency decision-making in 
the national security realm. And the national security 
bureaucrats, in turn, without significant judicial (or 
congressional) scrutiny, have few incentives to alter their 
regulatory processes to make them accessible or susceptible to 
judicial review. And so on.  
Since World War II, the national security state has operated 
under these conditions, except when some exogenous shock—
Watergate, 9/11—has caused serious re-thinking and efforts to 
impose more oversight.136 But this oversight was always 
conceived of as an attempt to alter the national security state’s 
behavior without disturbing the regulated-war-machine 
paradigm. 
III. Regulating National Security Bureaucracy 
However, most of the factors discussed above, which led to 
the current dominance of the regulated-war-machine paradigm, 
are not permanent.137 They are, in fact, becoming less and less 
salient. The last wave of globalization did much to blur the 
distinctions between the foreign and the domestic—distinctions 
that had given the government’s national security activities their 
                                                                                                     
Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 401, 456 (1975) (“[Courts] may demand that agencies develop a record that 
enables a reviewing court to find an intelligible answer for each substantial 
challenge posed.”). 
 136. See BOBBITT, supra note 55, at 248 (discussing the unconstitutional 
executive practices pre-Watergate); Dalal, supra note 99, at 78 (observing that 
revelations in the early 1970s about widespread national security-related 
abuses of power forced the nation “into a national dialogue about the 
constitutional boundaries of executive power . . . and the appropriateness of 
domestic intelligence gathering”). 
 137.  See Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs 
Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 127 (2009) (“[I]t is evident that in today’s 
topsy-turvy world governments can topple and relationships can change in a 
moment.” (quoting Nat'l Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 
551, 554–56 (2d Cir. 1988))). 
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most compelling claim to uniqueness.138 Also as a result of 
globalization, the nature of warfare has changed in fundamental 
ways so that it looks much more like what we have always 
conceived of as regulation.139 And surprisingly, the unique 
bureaucratic features of the national security state make it easier 
to construct a simple model of how it regulates than agencies 
regulating in other areas.  
In the first subpart below, I describe the political, 
technological, and legal changes that have created fertile ground 
for a shift to a warfare-as-regulation paradigm. In the second 
subpart, I describe this new paradigm and explain its advantages 
over the predominant regulated-war-machine paradigm. 
A. Laying the Groundwork for the Warfare-as-Regulation 
Paradigm 
1. The Expanding Scope of National Security 
The distinction in law and policy between the foreign and the 
domestic—and between what is and is not “national security”—is 
fading.140 Because people, products, and information cross 
national borders as never before, national security concerns 
continue to expand to new areas of government policymaking.141 
                                                                                                     
 138. See id. at 127 (2009) (“[D]rawing a sharp distinction between domestic 
and foreign relations issues creates boundary problems . . . .”). 
 139. See BOBBITT, supra note 55, at 178–79 (quoting Henry Kissinger’s 
observation that the wars against non-state actors “signal . . . an inevitable 
transformation of the international order resulting from changes in the internal 
structure of many key participants, and from the democratization of politics, the 
globalization of economics, and the instantaneousness of communications”). 
 140. See Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations 
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1258 (2007) (observing that “the explosion of 
international lawmaking, economic globalization, transnational flows of people, 
and transborder information flows occasioned by the transformation of 
communications technology . . . [have] radically increased the number of cases 
[in U.S. courts] that directly implicate foreign relations”). 
 141. See Ivo H. Daalder & James M. Lindsay, The Globalization of Politics: 
American Foreign Policy for a New Century, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Jan. 1, 
2013), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-globalization-of-politics-american-
foreign-policy-for-a-new-century/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (“Globalization is 
not just an economic phenomenon, but a political, cultural, military, and 
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The gravest security threats come primarily from small groups 
and individuals, rather than nation-states.142 In response, 
government more closely monitors the public to learn about and 
stop these threats.143 In the era of high-tech global surveillance, a 
mere search algorithm can determine the difference, for a U.S. 
agency, between what is foreign and domestic.144 These changes 
have led to increasing entanglement of the government’s national 
security activities with the lives of ordinary Americans.145 
With the expansion of national security regulating into 
previously “domestic” domains, its concentrated costs are being 
imposed, with greater frequency, on American citizens and 
individuals inside the United States.146 These costs include not 
only the appropriation of private information,147 but also, for 
certain targeted communities, the higher costs associated with 
greater scrutiny of their activities, infiltration by government 
agents, and even detention.148 
                                                                                                     
environmental one as well.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 142. See Huq, supra note 70, at 908 (describing the shift from “state-based 
enemies” to “new threats in the more fragmented international environment”). 
 143. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1934, 1938 (2013) (observing that democracies have “invested heavily in 
surveillance technologies in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 
America, the London subway bombings of 2005, and other atrocities”). 
 144. See William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of 
Needles in Haystacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1634 (2010) (“Instead of building 
toward an individual FISA application by developing leads on 
individuals[,] . . . officials now develop algorithms that search thousands or even 
millions of collected e-mail messages and telephone calls for indications of 
suspicious activities.”). 
 145. See id. at 1635 (“[M]ore Americans than ever are engaged in 
international communications, and there is far greater intelligence interest in 
communications to and from Americans. Both circumstances increase the 
likelihood that the government will be intercepting communications of innocent 
Americans . . . .”). 
 146. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the 
Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1613, 1678 (2009) (observing that “every government action is 
redistributive; the 9/11 response had different effects on Muslim Americans and 
on other Americans”). 
 147. See Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 667, 678 (2013) (observing that firms retain consumer data 
because of the costs associated with destroying it). 
 148. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND 
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2. The Changing Nature of Warfare 
As I discussed above, traditional warfare—its clashing 
armies and total-war modes—is hard to model as regulation. But 
these modes of warfare are quite rare today.149 “Kill-capture” is 
still part of the strategy for defeating non-state, terrorist, 
enemies.150 Yet without a uniformed military to target or an 
easily-identifiable battlefield, kill-capture requires the U.S. 
national security bureaucracy to expend considerable resources in 
intelligence gathering and deliberation simply to identify the 
enemy and, once identified, decide whether he is worth targeting 
or capturing.151 This process is an individualized determination, a 
“quasi-adjudicative” one.152 In other words, the process is a form 
of agency adjudication. 
With enemy responsibility individuated,153 “kill-capture” 
looks very much like—in fact is—a form of regulation. More 
                                                                                                     
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 22–46 (2003) (describing 
the federal government’s preventative detention campaign targeting Muslim 
Americans that ensued after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001); Tom 
R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects 
in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 365, 369 (2010) (explaining that Muslim Americans cooperate with law 
enforcement in an effort to avoid intrusive policing strategies, such as intensive 
frisks and detention). 
 149. See SITARAMAN, supra note 87, at 1 (“Rather [than traditional warfare], 
insurgents hibernate in the shadows, emerging only when ready for devastating 
attack . . . .”). 
 150. See BOBBITT, supra note 55, at 18 (observing in 2008 that the U.S. 
strategy was “to kill or capture the terrorists before a catastrophic attack 
happens”). 
 151. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 20, at 1524 (“[T]he government is 
individuating the responsibility of specific enemies and targeting only those 
engaged in specific acts or employed in specific roles.”); McNeal, supra note 25, 
at 684 (“Bureaucrats help create lists of people to be killed . . . . The process is 
called targeted killing . . . .”). 
 152. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 20, at 1560; (discussing the 
Detention Review Board’s procedures once an enemy combatant is detained); 
Stephen Vladeck, Targeted Killing and Judicial Review, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
11, 26 (2014) (“[T]he U.S. [is] increasingly moving toward a paradigm in which 
the use of force is based upon individualized determinations made thousands of 
miles away from any battlefield utilizing secret and otherwise unreviewable 
criteria.”). 
 153. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 20, at 1527 (“[I]t is difficult to 
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generally, warfare has become suffused with legality: 
commanders, with assistance from omnipresent judge advocates, 
must constantly apply complex sets of legal rules when planning 
operations and engaging the enemy.154 Law enforcement—the 
traditional regulatory means for addressing individuated 
responsibility that triggers serious legal consequences—works 
alongside the national security bureaucracy to such an extent 
that warfare is becoming more like law enforcement, and law 
enforcement more like warfare.155  
Moreover, as scholars have documented, years of experience 
in Iraq and Afghanistan have reminded the national security 
bureaucracy that “kill-capture” is often an inadequate strategy, 
by itself, for defeating a terrorist enemy.156 The focus of U.S. 
                                                                                                     
know that an individual is part of a terrorist organization on any basis other 
than his own individual acts of terrorism.”). 
 154. See Michael L. Kramer & Michael N. Schmitt, Lawyers on Horseback? 
Thoughts on Judge Advocates and Civil-Military Relations, 55 UCLA L. REV. 
1407, 1423–24 (2008) (“In contemporary U.S. operations, judge advocates are 
fully integrated members of military staffs. The senior judge advocate assigned 
to a unit serves as a personal advisor to the commander, ensuring that the 
commander receives sufficient timely and accurate advice to conduct operations 
in accordance with law and policy.”); U.S. AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOC. 
3-60, TARGETING, 95 (2006) (defining the “Role of the Judge Advocate” to include 
“an affirmative duty to provide legal advice to commanders and their staffs that 
is consistent with the international and domestic legal obligations”). Lawyers 
are increasingly present in every aspect of the government’s national security 
activities. See Schlanger, supra note 21, at 118 (“Intelligence legalism brings 
lawyers’ rule-of-law commitment into the realm of national security . . . .”). 
 155. See Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of Targeted 
Killing, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 145, 148 (2010) (“[T]he fact that all targeted 
killing operations in combating terrorism are directed against particular 
individuals makes the tactic more reminiscent of a law enforcement paradigm, 
where power is employed on the basis of individual guilt rather than status 
(civilian/combatant).”); John T. Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process, 
15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 767 (2007) (“[W]ar has changed in its functions, 
to become more like policing, [and] that policing too has changed, to become 
more like war.”); Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the 
Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 
1081 (2008) (arguing that the traditional criminal model and the traditional 
military model have converged in the context of counterterrorism detention 
efforts). 
 156.  Counterinsurgency strategy, or COIN, was a key feature of U.S. 
military strategy long before 9/11. See SITARAMAN, supra note 87, at 5 
(“[Counterinsurgency operations] include killing and capturing insurgents and 
also reconciling with them, arming local militias and also training state-run 
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military policy has focused more and more on the progressive 
branch of counterinsurgency strategy—a mode of warfare that 
seeks to incapacitate the enemy by undermining its support 
among the people it depends on for resources.157 Progressive 
counterinsurgency holds that kill-capture may do more harm 
than good because it causes “destruction that creates backlash 
among the population and fuels their support for the 
insurgency.”158 The progressive counterinsurgent instead 
attempts to build popular support by shoring up the rule of law 
and essential services, “ensuring civilian security,” and, if 
necessary, revising public policies or even a nation’s basic law.159 
Progressive counterinsurgency strategy and traditional 
domestic regulation are so similar that the former qualifies as a 
type of regulation. Like domestic regulation, counterinsurgency is 
“a set of interventions, those policies that society uses to 
structure the interactions and behaviors of its people.”160 Both are 
concerned with striking the correct balance between technocratic 
effectiveness and accommodating political interests.161 And the 
weapons in the progressive counterinsurgent’s arsenal closely 
resemble—indeed, overlap with—the key features of effective 
traditional domestic regulation. The progressive 
counterinsurgency must establish legitimacy by complying with 
the sources of, and limits to, its own authority—its domestic law 
                                                                                                     
security forces, working with local power brokers and rooting out corruption.”).  
 157.  See id. at 66–67 (discussing counterinsurgency forces’ utilization on a 
“win-the-population strategy”); DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-24, 
INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERING INSURGENCIES v (2014) [hereinafter 
COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL] (“Provid[ing] a doctrinal foundation for 
counterinsurgency.”). 
 158. SITARAMAN, supra note 87; see also COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL, 
supra note 157, at 1–31 (“[I]f a population does not see outside forces as 
legitimate, this can undermine the legitimacy of the host-nation government 
trying to counter an insurgency.”). 
 159. SITARAMAN, supra note 87, at 38. 
 160. Id. at 18. 
 161. See id. at 6 (discussing whether counterinsurgency is a “technocratic 
enterprise” or “policy choice”); Rascoff, supra note 70, at 644 (viewing the 
concern that presidential control will “politicize” intelligence “as a species of 
concern that overhangs all administrative law: how to strike the right balance 
between technocratic detachment and expertise on the one hand, and political 
control on the other”). 
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and international law.162 It must make rule-of-law development 
accessible to popular participation.163 It must be as transparent 
as possible.164 And once it has established a strong and legitimate 
rule of law, it may need to maintain it by punishing individuals 
or entities who refuse to comply.165 
One fundamental aspect of traditional warfare that remains 
salient, however, is secrecy.166 Overclassification of national 
security information has been a serious problem for decades, 
                                                                                                     
 162. See COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 157, at 13-1 
(outlining the sources of legal authority for U.S. counterinsurgency efforts); 
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 171 (3d ed. 1991) (observing that the 
doctrine of ultra vires “is the root principle of administrative power. The statute 
is the source of agency authority as well as of its limits”); Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462–63 (2003) (describing “concern 
for administrative arbitrariness . . . [as] an important obstacle to agency 
legitimacy”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2012) (authorizing a reviewing court 
to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to 
be . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of 
statutory right”). 
 163. See SITARAMAN, supra note 87, at 14 (“When it comes to building the 
rule of law . . . counterinsurgents must focus . . . on supporting institutions that 
work at the local level . . . .”); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American 
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1670 (1975) (“Increasingly, the 
function of administrative law is . . . the provision of a surrogate political 
process to ensure the fair representation of a wide range of affected interests in 
the process of administrative decision.”). 
 164. See SITARAMAN, supra note 87, at 16 (positing that counterinsurgency 
efforts should be both legally and sociologically legitimate by following processes 
that are “transparent” and “fair”); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability 
and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2075 (2005) 
(“[T]rue accountability, in the realm of law and politics, involves many of the 
features that are central to the administrative state and that people find so 
unattractive about it—hierarchy, monitoring, reporting, internal rules, 
investigations, and job evaluations.”). 
 165. See SITARAMAN, supra note 87, at 20 (concluding that counterinsurgency 
strategy, once established, enables the host-state to “fight and punish criminals 
and insurgents”); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory 
Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1344 (2013) 
(justifying the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs assertion of control 
over agency decision making). 
 166. See PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 4, at 86–87 (discussing the 
predominance of the U.S. government’s intelligence gathering in the War on 
Terror). 
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despite attempts at reform.167 Since September 11, the number of 
government employees and contractors with security clearances 
and the number of documents—including agency rules—that 
were subject to some form of classification grew dramatically.168 
Nonetheless, the secrecy pandemic in the national security 
bureaucracy is not inconsistent with the warfare-as-regulation 
paradigm. As Daniel Patrick Moynihan observed, government 
secrecy is itself a form of regulation.169 Likewise, there may be 
more method than madness behind the massive, regular leakage 
of classified national security information—that phenomenon, 
too, is a form of regulation.170 And even while the national 
security bureaucracy’s penchant for secrecy has grown unabated, 
its capacity to keep secrets may be diminishing.171  
3. Declining Judicial Deference 
 Courts’ reluctance to scrutinize the national security state’s 
activities has historically contributed to the difficulty of modeling 
those activities as regulation.172 However, since the end of the 
                                                                                                     
 167. See id. at 80–81 (describing the “indiscriminate overproduction” of data 
that renders intelligence difficult for government agencies to use).  
 168. See id. at 86 (“[Arkin] discovered that 263 of these organizations had 
been established or refashioned in the wake of 9/11.”).  
 169. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 94, at 59 (“Secrecy is a form of regulation.”). 
 170. See David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government 
Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 512, 514–16 (2013) (describing the “regulatory regime applicable to 
leaking” as “an intricate ecosystem” in which the informal tolerance of leaking 
serves executive and bureaucratic purposes); Rascoff, supra note 70, at 687 
(labeling “selective disclosure” of classified information “a form of regulation”). 
 171. See Mark Fenster, The Implausibility of Secrecy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 
316 n.30 (2013) (“[L]egal and bureaucratic systems of control fail 
and . . . information can and will escape in a myriad of ways . . . .”); Peter Swire, 
The Declining Half-Life of Secrets and the Future of Signals Intelligence, at 3 
(New Am. Cybersecurity Fellows, Paper Ser. No. 1, 2015), 
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/4425-the-declining-half-life-of-
secrets/Swire_DecliningHalf-
LifeOfSecrets.f8ba7c96a6c049108dfa85b5f79024d8.pdf (arguing that secrets 
have a “declining half-life” and that intelligence agencies should be prepared for 
their activities to be revealed to the public). 
 172. See supra Part I.E (discussing the legal doctrines that restrict judicial 
review of national security matters). 
WARFARE AS REGULATION 1989 
Cold War and the last wave of globalization, and continuing 
through the post-9/11 period, the U.S. Supreme Court has shown 
an increased willingness, in some situations, to review those 
activities and give less deference to the national security state’s 
legal and factual determinations.173 In doing so, it has limited the 
scope of earlier, more deferential, precedent.174 
In Zivotofsky v. Clinton,175 for example, the Court rejected 
the government’s argument that the political question doctrine 
barred courts from deciding whether U.S. citizens born in 
Jerusalem may designate their birthplace on U.S. passports as 
“Israel” or “Jerusalem.”176 Similarly, in Bond v. United States 
(Bond I)177 the Court recognized an individual’s standing to 
challenge, on Tenth Amendment grounds, a statute 
implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention.178 And in 
several other recent cases, the Court has declined to apply 
extraordinary deference to the President’s and agencies’ 
interpretations of treaties and statutes on issues deeply 
implicating foreign affairs and national security.179  
                                                                                                     
 173. Compare, e.g., Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 128, at 1924 
(discussing the Roberts Court’s rejection of the political question doctrine in 
recent cases), and Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the 
Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 785 (2011) 
(citing a number of recent Supreme Court decisions that embrace judicial review 
of international law issues, including national security), with Curtis A. Bradley, 
Foreign Relations Law and the Purported Shift Away from “Exceptionalism”, 
128 HARV. L. REV. F. 294, 294 (2015) (disagreeing with the scholarship that 
posits that the Roberts Court increasingly treats international law cases like 
“run-of-the-mill” domestic law cases). 
 174. See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 128, at 1902 (noting the historical 
norm that the judiciary defers to the political branches of government on issues 
of international law). 
 175. 566 U.S. 189 (2012). 
 176. Id. at 194. 
 177. 564 U.S. 211 (2011). 
 178. Id. at 225–26. 
 179. See Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2258 (2014) 
(affirming the lower court’s decision that Argentina’s foreign assets are not 
immune from discovery under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Bond v. 
United States (Bond II), 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2081–82 (2014) (holding that a treaty 
about chemical warfare and terrorism does not reach local criminal defendants); 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (2013) (concluding 
that there is a presumption against extraterritoriality with respect to granting 
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But the Court’s most striking departure from its past 
deference occurred in the quartet of Guantanamo cases.180 Most 
significantly, in Boumediene v. Bush,181 the Court rejected the 
executive branch’s foreign policy arguments, and bucked 
Congress as well, to restore the norm of habeas review.182 In 
doing so, the Court pointedly declined to defer to the executive 
branch’s factual assessments of military necessity.183  
Moreover, the Court’s refusal to defer to Executive Branch 
legal and factual determinations in the Guantanamo cases 
altered national security policy. After Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,184 the 
Department of Defense (DOD) established a process, the 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), for making an 
individual determination about the enemy combatant status of all 
detainees at Guantanamo.185 After the Court recognized statutory 
habeas jurisdiction there, Congress passed the Detainee 
                                                                                                     
aliens jurisdiction in U.S. federal courts under the Alien Tort Statute); Morrison 
v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010) (“[A]pply[ing] the 
presumption [against extraterritoriality] in all cases,” including suits that arise 
under Securities Exchange Commission regulations); Medellín v. Texas, 552 
U.S. 491, 498–99 (2008) (holding that an International Court of Justice decision 
was not domestically enforceable).  
 180. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 730 (2008) (holding that 
Congress’s attempt to eliminate habeas corpus for accused non-citizen enemy 
combatants at Guantanamo Bay was unconstitutional); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
548 U.S. 557, 624 (2006) (declaring unlawful the military commissions 
established to try certain enemy combatants for war crimes); Rasul v. Bush, 542 
U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (holding that alien detainees at Guantanamo had a 
statutory right to invoke habeas jurisdiction); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 
509 (2004) (holding that citizen-detainees possessed the right to challenge their 
detention using habeas). 
 181. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).  
 182. See id. at 771 (“If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to the 
detainees now before us, Congress must act in accordance with the 
requirements of the Suspension Clause.”). 
 183. See id. at 727 (“The Constitution grants Congress and the President the 
power to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, not the power to decide when 
and where its terms apply.”). 
 184. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).  
 185. See Kent Roach & Gary Trotter, Miscarriages of Justice in the War 
Against Terror, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 967, 1015–16 (2005) (observing critical due 
process defects in the CSRTs, but noting that the order establishing them was 
“inspired” by Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Hamdi). 
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Treatment Act,186 establishing direct judicial review of CSRT 
determinations in lieu of habeas.187 Similarly, after the Court 
declared the military commissions unlawful in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld,188 the Administration was obligated to seek 
congressional approval for commissions that restored some of the 
rights afforded at courts martial.189 The ruling also altered 
interrogation policy, compelling the government to acknowledge 
the application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions,190 which prompted closure of CIA black sites. And 
overall, these judicial interventions helped trigger a shift away 
from capture altogether and toward an emphasis on targeted 
killing.191  
This decline in deference, however nascent and sporadic,192 
has been driven in part by the Court’s recognizing the 
developments noted above—the dissolving boundaries between 
domestic and foreign affairs, and the changing, differentiated 
nature of warfare.193 If this trend continues, it would provide 
                                                                                                     
 186. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739, 2739–44 (2005) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
 187. The DTA review process was held by the Supreme Court in Boumediene 
to be an inadequate substitute for habeas, and quickly fell into disuse. 
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 728. 
 188. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 189. See Jack M. Balkin, Hamdan as a Democracy-Forcing Decision, 
BALKINIZATION (June 29, 2006, 1:07 PM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/06/hamdan-as-democracy-forcing-decision.html 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (describing how Article 36 of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice forces the president to seek congressional approval before 
creating specialized military tribunals) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 190. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 563 (“Common Article 3’s requirements are 
general, crafted to accommodate a wide variety of legal systems, but they are 
requirements nonetheless.”). 
 191. See Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through 
the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 804 (2011) [hereinafter Chesney, Who May 
Be Held?] (concluding that the scrutiny of U.S. military detention via habeas 
proceedings led to a dramatic increase in drones strikes as a means of 
incapacitating enemies); Crandall, supra note 73, at 598 (arguing that the 
increased use of targeted killing was an unintended consequence of courts’ 
limiting authority over military detention). 
 192. See Bradley, supra note 173, at 297 (arguing that a trend in 
international law toward “normalization” has not been established).  
 193. See supra notes 138–142 and accompanying text (noting changes in the 
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more fertile soil for developing a body of administrative law 
regarding warfare-as-regulation.194 
B. The Warfare-as-Regulation Paradigm and its Advantages 
The developments discussed above make constructing a 
warfare-as-regulation paradigm a viable and useful project, even 
if it would not have been a generation ago. Yet the fact remains 
that the national security state has always regulated. It has a 
long history of intervention in the private domain, both at home 
and abroad—through conscription, occupation, surveillance, and 
other activities. What has changed is only the degree and scope of 
the intervention. The warfare-as-regulation paradigm opens up 
the mysterious war machine to reveal the regulatory mechanisms 
that have always existed within. 
As with domestic agencies, the most important questions 
about the national security state’s regulating concern, not only its 
compliance with legal authority, but its effectiveness and 
efficiency. Is it regulating less or more than necessary to 
successfully manage risks to the United States, its citizens, and 
its interests abroad? Is it regulating through the most efficient 
means? 
In the domestic context, the degree of regulation is typically 
measured by the financial costs it imposes on regulated entities—
businesses and individuals.195 But regulation also implicates 
many costs that are harder to measure—such as human life, 
health, liberty, and happiness.196  
                                                                                                     
nature of warfare and the subsequent expansion of presidential authority). For 
analysis attributing the Court’s lack of deference in the Guantanamo cases to its 
recognition that the U.S. plays a unique geopolitical leadership role, see 
Knowles, supra note 138, at 782. For alternative explanations for the outcomes 
in these cases, see generally Bradley, supra note 173. 
 194. See Hafetz, supra note 97, at 2144–45 (arguing that national security 
law fits within the broader category of administrative law). 
 195. See Richard G. Morgan & James H. Holt, Measuring the Costs of 
Regulation, 59 TEX. L. REV. 623, 623–24 (reviewing PAUL W. MACAVOY, 
MEASURING THE COSTS OF REGULATION: THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES AND THE 
ECONOMY (1979), and agreeing with his approach to evaluating the efficacy of 
regulation through economic analysis). 
 196. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON 
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In the national security context, the simplest way to measure 
the degree of regulation is by examining the degree of force or 
coercion that the government applies. For example, how many 
will be killed from the use of lethal force? What is the value of the 
property that will be destroyed? How long will detainees be 
deprived of liberty? How coercive will interrogation methods be? 
How intrusive will surveillance or border screening be?  
But like its domestic counterparts, the national security 
bureaucracy’s regulating also imposes costs that are more 
difficult to measure.197 How should the U.S. government estimate 
the value of foreign lives lost?198 Will the number of deaths and 
the level of property destruction from targeting operations 
demoralize enemy armed groups or instead build support for 
those groups?199 Will scrutinizing Muslim communities in the 
U.S. increase or decrease cooperation with law enforcement?200 
Will regulating foreign citizens through the use of force increase 
or diminish U.S. “soft power”?201 
An accurate regulatory model of national security activities 
should depict the true costs and benefits of a regulatory method—
e.g., targeted killing operations using drones or military 
detention at Guantanamo—by comparing it to the costs of 
                                                                                                     
KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 9 (2005) 
(“[T]here is no reason to think that the right answers will emerge from the 
strange process of assigning dollar values to human life, human health, and 
nature itself, and then crunching the numbers.”).  
 197. See, e.g., Arden Rowell & Lesley Wexler, Valuing Foreign Lives, 48 GA. 
L. REV. 499, 502 (2014) (exploring “the question of how a government should 
allocate domestic resources for foreign benefit” and identifying it as “a discrete 
analytical category”). 
 198. See id. at 554 (arguing for a comprehensive approach to the valuation of 
foreign lives).  
 199. See id. at 541 (“[S]tates may benefit from complying with or exceeding 
their international valuation obligations by winning the hearts and minds of 
other populations.”). 
 200. See Tyler, Schulhofer & Huq, supra note 148, at 388–89 (concluding 
that whether Muslim Americans believe law enforcement treats them fairly 
“influence[s] cooperation in the successful accomplishment of counterterrorism 
goals”). 
 201. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD 
POLITICS x (explaining that soft power “is the ability to get what you want 
through . . . the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and 
policies”). 
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regulating through other means or not regulating at all.202 This 
cost-benefit analysis should reveal whether the regulatory model 
efficiently accomplishes the goal of managing risk.203 
Indeed, some weighing of costs and benefits is a feature of 
international law principles governing national security 
activities.204 Under core principles of international humanitarian 
law, for example, military commanders planning lethal 
operations must conduct a proportionality analysis—they must 
determine whether the degree of force they use is justified, given 
the military necessity and the risk of collateral harm.205  
Accurately weighing costs and benefits of regulation in the 
national security context is difficult. Yet the 
warfare-as-regulation paradigm has several advantages over the 
regulated-war-machine paradigm—whether the objective is to 
reduce costs for the United States government and its taxpayers, 
to ensure better compliance with domestic and international law, 
or to discourage the overreliance on modes of warfare with long-
term harmful consequences.206 
First, viewing warfare as regulation ties together several 
developments that, to this point, lack a cohesive explanatory 
model. The first is the well-founded concern that national 
security activities are insufficiently protective of individual rights 
                                                                                                     
 202. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (summarizing literature 
about regulators’ goal of mitigating risk). 
 203. See DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 55, at 878 (critiquing scholarship 
that analyzes common fallacies of cost-benefit analysis in administrative law).  
 204. See Amos N. Guiora, Targeted Killing: When Proportionality Gets All 
Out of Proportion, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 235, 252 (2012) (discussing the 
concept of proportionality in the context of national security decision-making).  
 205. See Protocol Additional for the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 
51(5)(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I] 
(providing that International Humanitarian Law prohibits “an attack which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”). 
 206. My working assumption here is that a more accurate weighing of costs 
and benefits will, on balance, lead to better compliance with substantive 
principles of domestic and international law. I am not arguing, however, that 
either U.S. domestic or international law strictly requires the application of the 
robust cost-benefit analysis I propose. 
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guaranteed by U.S. constitutional and international law.207 The 
second is the infusion of legality and lawyers into the process of 
war-making.208 The third is the frequent introduction, by analysts 
and scholars, of proposed reforms seeking to require more 
deliberation, justification, and accuracy in those activities.209 And 
the fourth are recent efforts by the President to centralize and 
coordinate many national security activities and expose them to 
stronger White House control.210  
These developments strongly suggest there is a widespread, 
if not universal, impression that the national security state 
overregulates.211 But that impression should be tested through a 
model that maps power dynamics and incentives in the same way 
that other models have mapped domestic regulation. 
Indeed, the warfare-as-regulation model offers an alternative 
method of evaluating reform proposals that is better attuned to 
the specific bureaucratic pathologies those proposals are really 
intended to address. Scholars and analysts have proposed 
numerous procedural reforms to the targeted killing process, such 
as adding some form of judicial, inter-agency, congressional, or 
intra-agency review.212 These proposals are generally aimed at 
requiring better deliberation, improving targeting accuracy, and 
ensuring compliance with due process and international law.213 
                                                                                                     
 207. See, e.g., Guiora, supra note 204, at 242 (taking issue with U.S. 
counterterrorism policy that relies on “ends-based decision making rather than 
decision making based on morality and law”). 
 208. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (describing the role of 
judge-advocates within the U.S. military’s judicial process). 
 209. See, e.g., Matthew Craig, Targeted Killing, Procedure, and False 
Legitimation, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2349, 2378–83 (2014) (describing several 
proposals for targeted killing procedures). 
 210. See Rascoff, supra note 70, at 635 (“The tectonic shift toward 
presidential control of agencies has reverberated throughout the federal 
bureaucracy, including a large swath of the national security state . . . .”). 
 211. See Michael Jo, Note, National Security Preemption: The Case of 
Chemical Safety Regulation, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2065, 2016 (2010) (arguing that 
“the reclassification of seemingly domestic regulatory concerns as matters of 
national security” expanded the government’s regulatory authority). 
 212. See Craig, supra note 209, at 2378–83 (summarizing proposals to 
reform extrajudicial targeted killing). 
 213. See id. (describing three particular proposals, but questioning 
“whether, and to what degree, different targeting procedures stand to confer 
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The problem is that these worthy goals cannot be effectively 
pursued without analyzing how and why the targeting 
bureaucracy may, or may not, fail to prioritize them. Instead, 
reforms become mired in the endless debate about locating the 
correct point of balance between vaguely-formulated values of 
liberty and security.214  
Moreover, it is far too easy for the national security 
bureaucrat to claim that it already takes due process values into 
account in its decision-making, or to accede to procedural changes 
that do little to alter outcomes.215 It may, in other words, offer 
merely the veneer of due process by employing “rule of law 
tropes”216 that result in “false legitimation.”217  
In contrast, a regulatory model that maps bureaucratic 
incentives can reveal to the reformer how those incentives may be 
channeled, altered or counter-balanced.218 Adjusting bureaucratic 
behavior is the shortest path to changing policy.219 
Second, the warfare-as-regulation paradigm shifts the focus 
of the reform debate from the rights possessed by targets of 
national security activities to the sources of authority for those 
activities and their effectiveness.220 Most targets and collateral 
                                                                                                     
legitimacy on targeted killing at all”). 
 214. See RICHARD POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME 
OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 31 (2006) (“[O]ne would like to locate . . . the point of 
balance [which] shifts continuously as threats to liberty and safety wax and 
wane.”); DONOHUE, supra note 119, at 3 (arguing that the “security or freedom 
framework” creates the risk that “the true cost” of exercises of counterterrorism 
powers “will go uncalculated”). 
 215. See generally Sinnar, supra note 99 (quoting Attorney General Holder 
that due process does not necessitate judicial process).  
 216. Id. at 1618. 
 217. See generally Craig, supra note 209 (discussing how the government 
can avoid false legitimation in the context of targeted killing). 
 218. See Note, Judicial Intervention and Organization Theory: Changing 
Bureaucratic Behavior and Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 513, 519 (1980) (“To fashion 
effective changes in policy and administration, decision-makers must be able to 
collect information, assess various alternatives, monitor the implementation 
process, and secure the compliance of the targeted bureaucracies.”). 
 219. See id. at 519 (“The implementation of new policies and procedures 
often involves changing the behavior of public bureaucracies . . . .”). 
 220. See Schlanger, supra note 21, at 118 (“[The] relentless focus on rights 
and compliance and law (with a definition of law that includes regulation, 
executive orders, court orders, etc.) has obscured the absence of what should be 
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victims of the U.S. drone program are “strangers to the 
Constitution[:]”221 they have no rights that flow from citizenship, 
presence on U.S. territory, or any prior connection to the U.S.222 
Although they have rights derived from international law, those 
rights are vaguely formulated and often contested, and some may 
not apply in wartime.223 The exercise of U.S. national security 
authority, by contrast, despite vague statutory grants, actually 
involves complex sets of internal rules embedded in a hierarchical 
structure.224 Decades of counterinsurgency warfare have 
acculturated the military to constantly checking the use of force 
against sources of lawful authority.225 Analysis that investigates 
and critiques interpretation of that authority is more likely to 
alter military practice than explorations of rights that may or 
may not apply.226 
At the same time, the warfare-as-regulation paradigm 
actually focuses more attention on those targets and communities 
affected by national security activities because it treats them as 
                                                                                                     
an additional focus on interests, or balancing, or policy.”). 
 221. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 189 (1996) 
(describing efforts to deny constitutional rights to aliens and immigrants inside 
the U.S. and U.S. citizens outside U.S. borders and arguing that “no human 
being subject to the governance of the United States should be a stranger to the 
Constitution”). 
 222. See Marc D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, and 
Limited Government, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 854 (2010) (arguing for a 
constitutionally-grounded limited government approach to U.S. national 
security activities worldwide, under which the exercise of power will be 
constrained regardless of the targeted individual’s entitlement to rights).  
 223. See Mark V. Vlasic, Assassination & Targeted Killing—A Historical 
and Post-Bin Laden Legal Analysis, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 259, 277–81 (discussing 
the differences in international and U.S. domestic law on the legality of targeted 
killing). 
 224. See McNeal, supra note 25, at 681–83 (discussing the comprehensive 
processes for creating a kill list). 
 225. See SITARAMAN, supra note 87, at 89 (describing how the U.N. Charter 
Article 2(4) that serves as an authority for a state’s use of force affects 
counterinsurgency strategy); Robert M. Chesney, Iraq and the Military 
Detention Debate: Firsthand Perspectives from the Other War, 2003–2010, 51 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 549, 554 (2011) (analyzing legal compliance of military detention 
policies from After Action Reports produced by judge-advocates). 
 226. See Schlanger, supra note 21, at 172 (arguing that gaps in civil liberties 
during wartime would be better addressed by governmental entities outside the 
NSA). 
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regulated entities. Rather than viewing them as passive victims, 
the warfare-as-regulation paradigm is interested in their 
incentives and how they will respond to being “regulated.”227 In 
doing so, the warfare-as-regulation paradigm humanizes military 
targets and their communities. And the paradigm expands 
analysis beyond the narrow question of whether the targets 
qualify as “combatants” to the broader context—the effects 
regulation has on the communities where national security 
activities occur and the implications for long-term U.S. interests. 
IV. Targeted Killing as Regulation 
This section introduces a model of the U.S. government’s 
national security activities as regulation, using the targeted 
killing process as a case study. The purpose of this model is to 
identify the key participants in the regulatory process, map their 
relative degrees of influence and incentives, and hypothesize how 
these variables affect the regulatory process.  
This model is limited to the targeted killing process. Each 
category of the U.S. government’s national security endeavors—
other exercises of military force and intelligence gathering, 
progressive counterinsurgency, border control, military detention, 
interrogation, the prosecution of war crimes, and covert action—
constitutes a different form of regulation with its own set of 
institutional players, power dynamics, and incentives.228 
Modeling these other regulatory processes is a project for another 
day. However, given the common identity of the players and their 
oft-aligned incentives, I expect that the conclusions I draw about 
targeted killing as regulation will apply, to a greater or lesser 
extent, to most other national security activities. 
This model will strike many as too simple because it relies on 
a handful of assumptions from the economic branch of public 
choice theory, all of which have been subjected to formidable 
                                                                                                     
 227. See infra Part III.C (identifying innocent communities inadvertently 
affected by drone strikes as akin to a regulated entity because they have almost 
no power compared to the other key players). 
 228. Cf. Barkow, supra note 45, at 717–18 (noting the various ways in which 
the criminal justice system regulates). 
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criticism.229 It assumes, for starters, that all of the players in the 
process are rational actors.230 I do not discuss, for example, how 
behavioral biases may affect the players’ decisions.231  
I begin with this model for several reasons. First, in charting 
new territory, it is best to start with a simple model, test its 
predictive value, then move on to more sophisticated models as 
necessary.232 Second, the assumptions I rely on are quite popular 
in the legal scholarship analyzing agency functions;233 they form 
the basis for many legal and institutional reform proposals, 
which it is important to engage with.234 Finally, for reasons I 
discuss below, some unusual features of the national security 
bureaucracy actually lend themselves better to a simple economic 
public choice model than bureaucracies performing other 
regulatory functions.235 
                                                                                                     
 229. Cf. Mashaw, supra note 65, at 20 (“[T]he crucial unifying thread in 
public choice theory is the assumption that all actors in political life . . . behave 
rationally to maximize or optimize some objective function (wealth, status, 
power).”). 
 230. See id. at 33 (critique public choice theory with the observation that 
voters are often irrational).  
 231. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Jonathan Renshon, Hawkish Biases, in 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF FEAR: THREAT INFLATION SINCE 
9/11 79 (A. Trevor Thrall & Jane K. Cramer eds., 2009); see Lieutenant 
Commander Luke A. Whittemore, Proportionality Decision Making in Targeting: 
Heuristics, Cognitive Biases, and the Law, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 577, 614 (2016) 
(applying Kahneman’s literature to the targeted killing context).  
 232. See Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice, supra note at 65, at 23 
(describing the early research in public choice theory and how it influences 
today’s scholarship). 
 233. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 45, at 717–20 (comparing regulation of 
traditional industries to criminal justice); Sales, supra note 70, at 323–32 
(recounting national security agencies’ historical failures in sharing 
counterterrorist intelligence data). 
 234. See, e.g., Sales, supra note 70, at 348–51 (encouraging reform of 
national security agencies’ intelligence gathering related to counter terrorism); 
Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration, supra note 36, at 335 (proposing that 
some DOJ functions be moved to an executive agency to “add a layer of 
protection from prosecutorial pressure”).  
 235. See infra Part III.B (introducing an analysis of power dynamics in 
national security using public choice theory).  
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A. The Targeted Killing Process 
Targeted killing is “the intentional, premeditated, and 
deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting 
under color of law, or by an organized armed group in armed 
conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical 
custody of the perpetrator.”236 Drones are the vehicle of choice for 
most targeted killing operations.237 Indeed, they have become 
crucial to the exercise of U.S. air power: even manned aircraft are 
likely to have drone accompaniment on targeting missions.238 By 
2009, the Air Force was training more pilots to fly drones than 
conventional aircraft.239  
The U.S. government has been conducting two types of 
targeted killing using drones aimed at members of armed groups 
that, the U.S. government asserts, it is authorized to use force 
against under U.S. and international law.240 The first type are 
                                                                                                     
 236. See Alston, supra note 22, at 298 (noting that the use of drone strikes 
outside war zones has been criticized as unlawful “extrajudicial killings” and 
“assassinations”); Mary Ellen O’Connell, To Kill or Capture Suspects in the 
Global War on Terror, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 325, 331 (2003) (quoting critics 
such as Amnesty International and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial killing). See generally SCAHILL, supra note 25 (analyzing 
documents that reveal aspects of the American government’s assassination 
program using drones). 
 237. See Jaffer, supra note 2, at 9 (“Very quickly the armed drone—touted as 
distant, efficient, and precise—became identified with [Obama] . . . .”). 
 238. See, e.g., Barbara Starr, Obama Last Strike Kills Over 100 al Qaeda in 
Syria, CNNPOLITICS (Jan. 20, 2017, 6:25 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/20/politics/us-strike-syria-al-qaeda/index.html (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2017) (describing a strike against “core al Qaeda” in western 
Syria carried out by a B-52 bomber accompanied by drones) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 239. See SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 103 (quoting a top-secret NSA document 
stating that, “‘for the first time in the history of the U.S. Air Force, more pilots 
were trained to fly drones . . . than conventional fighter aircraft’”). 
 240. For a small sample of the extensive literature on the legal authority for, 
and limitations on, drone warfare, see U.N. General Assembly, Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Addendum: Rep. of the Special Rapporteur, 
¶ 18–22 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010); NILS MELZER, TARGETED 
KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 447–504 (2008); Kenneth Anderson, Targeted 
Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON 
TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 346–400 (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009); Robert 
Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the 
International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, in YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
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“personality strikes” at identified individuals who, after a 
multi-agency intelligence-gathering and deliberation process, are 
determined to be members of the groups and meet other 
criteria.241 “Signature strikes,” in contrast, target individuals 
whose identities may or may not be known at the time they are 
targeted, but who exhibit a pattern of behavior that, the 
government believes, indicates they are members of the groups.242 
Both types of strikes take place after considerable 
intelligence gathering and assessment, as well as the application 
of rules under predetermined procedures.243 The government has 
revealed far more information about the procedures leading to 
personality strikes, and the bureaucracy involved is presumably 
more robust. Each personality strike results from two 
adjudicatory proceedings—the first ends with the decision to 
place a potential target on the “kill list,” and the second ends 
with the strike decision.244  
The two types of strikes occur as part of a single drone 
program, conducted (often jointly) by the CIA and the DOD with 
the assistance of numerous intelligence-gathering agencies.245 
                                                                                                     
HUMANITARIAN LAW 13–27 (2010). 
 241. See generally Drone Playbook, supra note 25 (prescribing rules for the 
nomination and approval of targets for personality strikes and conducting 
signature strikes); McNeal, supra note 25, at 701–58 (describing the process in 
more detail, based on interviews with participants). 
 242. See generally Craig, supra note 209, at 2368; Marty Lederman, The 
Presidential Policy Guidance for Targeting and Capture Outside Afghanistan, 
Iraq and Syria, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 6, 2016, 2:40 PM), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/32298/presidential-policy-guidance-targeting-
capture-afghanistan-iraq-syria/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (observing from 
analysis of the Drone Playbook that signature strikes are conducted against 
both known and unknown individuals) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 243. See generally Drone Playbook, supra note 25 (outlining general 
operating procedures for when and how the United States can use force against 
terrorists); McNeal, supra note 25, at 701–58. 
 244. See McNeal, supra note 25, at 701–58. (explaining how targeting 
killings are conducted). I discuss the interagency approval process for 
personality strikes in more detail in Part V.A. 
 245. See Adam Entous & Gordon Lubold, Obama’s Drone Revamp Gives 
Military Bigger Responsibility, Keeps CIA Role, WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2016, 5:04 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/barack-obamas-long-awaited-drone-program-
revamp-preserves-a-cia-role-1466088122 (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (discussing 
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Private contractors play a critical and influential role in the 
process—from collecting intelligence, to analyzing it, to the 
remote piloting of drones.246 The drones themselves are expensive 
and built by companies with decades of experience selling 
weaponry and other equipment to the U.S. government.247 The 
government measures the success of the drone program primarily 
by the number of those killed who can be identified as armed 
group members.248 
B. The Key Players 
Economic public choice models of U.S. government regulatory 
activities typically include the following players—the regulating 
agencies; the regulated entities; the President; the Congress; the 
courts; and the American public. Often models will also include 
public interest organizations and any other institutions 
interested in the products of the regulatory process.249 In the 
targeted killing process, the model should include the private 
firms who help staff the program’s operation and those who 
                                                                                                     
the shift in control over drone programs to the U.S. military) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 246. See COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 48–50 (describing examples of specific 
services private contractors provide and the ways in which these contractors 
interact with and influence military officials); Michael S. Schmidt, Air Force, 
Running Low on Drone Pilots, Turns to Contractors in Terror Fight, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/06/us/air-force-drones-
terrorism-isis.html?mcubz=1&_r=0 (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (discussing the 
recent increase in the United States’ use of private contractors for drone 
attacks) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 247. See COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 51–72 (discussing the historical role 
equipment companies have had in U.S. military conflicts).  
 248. See id. at 68–72 (describing the testing accuracy of drones and the 
drones’ efficiency in locating Osama bin Laden); SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 10–
12. The government also assesses the effect of strikes on enemy activities and 
the long-term effects on U.S. foreign policy. See Drone Playbook, supra note 25, 
§ 1.G (“When considering a proposed operational plan, Principals and Deputies 
shall evaluate . . . [t]he implications for the broader regional and international 
political interests of the United States . . . .”). 
 249. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 23, at 5–6 (discussing the 
broadening of recent public choice models); Mashaw, Public Law and Public 
Choice, supra note 65, at 19–20 (describing the various lenses through which 
public choice theory can be viewed). 
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provide the necessary equipment. It should also include the small 
number of U.S. public interest organizations that pay close 
attention to, and are generally critical of, the drone program.250  
In addition, extraterritorial regulatory activities, such as 
targeted killing, involve a “two-level game,” in which U.S. 
institutions must be responsive to both domestic and 
international politics.251 So a model for targeted killing as 
regulation must also include foreign nations, their citizens, and 
international organizations with an interest in the targeted 
killing process.252 
C. The Power Dynamics 
The most notable aspect of the power dynamics in the 
targeted killing process is the dominance of the agencies—
especially the DOD and the CIA, which have been engaged in a 
power struggle for years over control of the program.253 Agency 
dominance in a national security regulatory process is neither 
unusual nor surprising. Secrecy and the complex, yet close-knit, 
structure of the bureaucracy give agencies vast coordination and 
information advantages which make congressional oversight 
                                                                                                     
 250. The most influential U.S. organization has probably been the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). See The Lawfare Podcast: Jameel Jaffer on the 
“The Drone Memos”, LAWFARE (Jan. 14, 2017, 1:30 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-jameel-jaffer-drone-memos (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2017) (discussing the ACLU’s efforts to hold the U.S. 
government accountable for its targeted killing practices) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 251. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of 
Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 434 (1988) (discussing the political 
complexities of international negotiations world players face in balancing 
domestic and international interests). 
 252. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Administrative War, 82 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1343, 1363 (2014) (“[O]ne may presume that the United States, like many 
other nation-states, responds to external pressures from the international 
system as well as domestic institutions, interests, and public priorities.”). 
 253. See generally Entous & Lubold, supra note 245 (describing President 
Obama’s active role in attempting to settle a “three-year turf battle” between 
the CIA, the DOD, and Congress over the CIA’s role in drone campaigns 
following the September 11, 2001 attacks). 
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extremely difficult.254 Accordingly, Congress has conducted very 
little oversight of the drone program.255 For similar reasons, the 
American public has even less capacity to assess, or even know 
about, regulation in the national security realm than the 
members of Congress who represent them.256 Elections rarely 
hinge on national security issues. For these reasons, the public 
also tends to be a weak institutional player.257 
Even the President, who has far better access to secret 
information and expert advice than members of Congress, has a 
limited ability to influence the trajectory of national security 
policies that are already in place.258 The President appoints only 
                                                                                                     
 254. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 17–18 (observing that national security 
bureaucrats “face no need for hearings or markups or floor debates”); ZEGART, 
supra note 63, at 27 (noting the distinction between the secrecy of national 
security agency activity and the relative openness of domestic policy agency 
activity); Damien Van Puyvelde, Intelligence Accountability and the Role of 
Public Interest Groups in the United States, 28 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SECURITY 
139, 147 (2013) (“[I]ncreased secrecy has impacted upon the legislative and 
judiciary branches’ ability to oversee and review intelligence activities.”). 
 255. One exception was President Obama’s nomination of John Brennan as 
CIA Director. Protests interrupted the hearings, and Brennan was questioned 
by senators about the targeted killing process. See McNeal, supra note 25, at 
777 (discussing Brennan’s confirmation hearings and how Senators used the 
nomination to hold President Obama politically accountable); Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, The Questions Brennan Can’t Dodge, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/opinion/the-questions-brennan-cant-
dodge.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (arguing that Senators should “hold Mr. 
Brennan to account for one of the administration’s gravest failings: its refusal to 
openly discuss the legal basis for America’s campaign of targeted killings of 
terrorism suspects”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 256. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 16–17 (discussing the expansive yet 
tight-knit nature of the U.S. national security culture); McNeal, supra note 25, 
at 789 (“There are few incentives for elected officials to exercise greater 
oversight over targeted killings, and interest group advocacy is not as strong in 
matters of national security and foreign affairs as it is in domestic politics.”). 
 257. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 8–9 (discussing the public’s general lack 
of focus on national security issues); McNeal, supra note 25, at 775 (noting that 
congressional political incentives generally favor support for targeted killing); 
ZEGART, supra note 63, at 26 (“[T]he relatively weak interest group environment 
substantially reduces Congress’s interest and role in creating new national 
security agencies. With interest groups largely out of the picture, the average 
member has little incentive to expend significant time and political capital in 
designing foreign policy agencies.”). 
 258. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 58–59 (discussing the President’s 
weaknesses in forging national security policy); Theodore Sorensen, You Get to 
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several hundred civilian officials to oversee a national security 
bureaucracy that, with contractors included, employs millions.259 
When NSC members are united on a particular policy—which 
they usually are—it is especially difficult for the President to say 
“no.”260 In 2009, four members of the NSC—the Secretary of 
Defense, Director of National Intelligence (DNI), CIA Director, 
and National Security Advisor—formed a united front to 
persuade President Obama to continue and expand the drone 
program begun under President Bush. Crucially, at the same 
time, they leveraged their control over information to “curtail 
discussion of the policy’s broader ramifications.”261 Although the 
President exercises direct supervisory authority over the 
program, and is involved in many of the ultimate decisions to 
conduct a strike, he must rely on the intelligence provided by the 
bureaucracy and the advice of the officials who lead it. 
Private firms, on the other hand, are so intimately involved 
in nearly every stage of the targeted killing process that their 
ability to influence regulatory policy is quite strong.262 The 
success of the program depends on the performance of their 
personnel and equipment.263 And a robust revolving door between 
the private and public sectors in this area contributes to the 
private firms’ power.264 Note that this is not a case of regulatory 
                                                                                                     
Walk to Work, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 19, 1967) (“Presidents rarely, if ever, 
make decisions—particularly in foreign affairs—in the sense of writing their 
conclusions on a clean slate . . . . [T]he basic decisions, which confine their 
choices, have all too often been previously made.”). 
 259. GLENNON, supra note 5, at 16. 
 260. See id. at 62–64 (noting that the “president must choose his battles 
carefully . . . he has limited political capital and must spend it 
judiciously . . . . Under the best of circumstances, he can only attack . . . policies 
one by one, in flanking actions, and even then with no certainty of victory”). 
 261. See id. at 61 (discussing VALI NASR, THE DISPENSABLE NATION: 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN RETREAT 180 (2013)). 
 262. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE, supra note 27, at 40–44. 
 263. See id. at 32–33 (discussing the drawbacks of the DOD cutting 
personnel and equipment).  
 264. See id. at 123 (discussing “the revolving door for government 
contracting officials and senior management and board members at contracting 
firms” and the ways in which congressional oversight fails to curb corruption). 
Because the interests of private contractors and the military are so closely 
aligned, it may be that contractors rarely actually influence policy. See Scott M. 
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capture in the now commonly understood sense—a scenario in 
which the regulated entities control the regulating agency.265 
Private firms here are more regulators than regulated.  
In fact, the targeting regulatory process harkens back to a 
different capture scenario—pro-regulatory capture by entities 
who are not themselves regulated, but stand to benefit, and in 
which the regulated entities have comparatively little influence 
in the process.266 An enormous asymmetry exists between the 
U.S. national security bureaucracy that regulates through 
targeted killing and the entities who are most directly 
regulated—(1) the targets themselves and (2) civilians who are 
mistakenly killed or whose lives and property are affected by the 
strikes. By the traditional measures, these individuals have 
almost zero influence in the regulatory process. As regulated 
entities, they most closely resemble those arrested or convicted of 
crimes,267 but their power position is even worse.268 Those affected 
by drone strikes live in remote areas where territory is often 
contested and governance is weak. Unlike most arrestees or 
convicts in the U.S. criminal justice system, they are, with rare 
exceptions, not citizens of the nation that is regulating them.269 
                                                                                                     
Sullivan, Private Force/Public Goods, 42 CONN. L. REV. 853, 856 (2010) (arguing 
that private military companies’ values and characteristics reflect a penchant 
for legal and regulatory compliance). But this could be changing as contractors 
seek to expand into nonmilitary markets. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the 
political pressures national security bureaucrats face concerning regulations). 
 265. See Nicholas Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1, 2 
(2010) (defining capture as a “shorthand for the phenomenon whereby regulated 
entities wield their superior organizational capacities to secure favorable agency 
outcomes at the expense of the diffuse public”); Livermore & Revesz, supra note 
165, at 1340 (listing sources and their definitions of regulatory capture). 
 266. See infra notes 301–304 and accompanying text (discussing the 
antiregulatory orientation of the public choice field). 
 267. See Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 45, at 726 (“[I]ndividuals 
who have been convicted of a crime are not a powerful interest group. The 
families and communities of these offenders may oppose the harsh sentencing 
laws, but they currently lack the political pull to present strong opposition.”). 
 268. See McNeal, supra note 25, at 775 (observing that “[t]here is no large 
[domestic] constituency that is impacted by the targeted killing program”). 
 269. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 1032, at 40 (noting that “[e]ven 
democratic states will act in a biased way toward noncitizens” and that domestic 
“mechanisms of accountability . . . can work against the interests of noncitizens 
affected by government policies”). In the extremely rare instance when a U.S. 
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Nor are they citizens of major global powers like China, or close 
U.S. allies, which could conceivably wield real influence in the 
regulatory process on their behalf.270 Even their own 
governments, for reasons of internal and global power politics, 
are usually unwilling or unable to advocate for them.271 
The only significant way the regulated entities may influence 
the targeting process relates to counterinsurgency strategy and 
blowback. Under a pure capture-kill approach, drone strikes that 
kill innocent civilians are simply imposing collateral damage. 
That collateral damage may exceed legal norms or be ethically 
abhorrent. But under a public choice model, these aspects alone 
have little potential to affect the targeting regulatory process. In 
contrast, if drone strikes are conducted as part of a progressive 
counterinsurgency strategy, where winning the population is the 
key to victory, those most affected by the targeting process can 
wield influence by shifting their support to the insurgency.272 If 
targeted killing as a tactic makes it more difficult to reach the 
strategic goal, policymakers may be persuaded to limit its use—in 
other words, to regulate less. 
                                                                                                     
citizen is targeted, the Drone Playbook requires that the President personally 
approve the strike decision. See Drone Playbook, supra note 25, §§ 19, 3.E.2. 
(discussing the presidential review procedures for drone strikes). 
 270. See Ashley Deeks, Checks and Balances from Abroad, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 
65, 67 (2016) (discussing the wide range of foreign actors who may influence 
domestic policy). The nations where strikes occur, or from which attacks are 
launched, may exercise meaningful negotiation constraints on U.S. drone policy 
if they choose. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 1032, at 37 (recognizing the 
potential of negotiation constraints as a limit on the global abuse of power); 
McNeal, supra note 25, at 779 (noting similar limits). But for the most part, 
they have not chosen to do so. In addition, the handful of targets who are 
citizens of allied nations tend to be outlaws, who could be punished under the 
criminal justice systems of their home nations or the United States if they could 
be arrested. 
 271. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 1032, at 40 (observing that 
“[a]ccountability in world politics is inextricably entangled with power 
relationships” and that “[w]eak actors—including small, poor countries in the 
Global South and, more, their often disenfranchised publics—–lack the capacity 
systematically to hold powerful actors accountable”). 
 272. See supra notes 154–163 and accompanying text (discussing the 
“kill-capture” method as a form of regulation). 
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As for the courts, they have demonstrated the potential to 
influence agencies’ national security regulating.273 By recognizing 
the due process rights of military detainees274 and constitutional 
habeas jurisdiction at Guantanamo Bay,275 the Supreme Court 
essentially forced agencies to create a combatant status review 
process276 and discouraged the use of the naval base as an 
offshore detention-interrogation center.277 The procedural 
difficulties this created for detention programs pressured 
policymakers to shift to a targeted killing strategy instead.278 And 
it was a successful Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit 
that forced the Obama Administration to release the Drone 
Playbook.279 However, despite a nascent shift toward increased 
judicial scrutiny of national security activities in recent years,280 
the courts are affecting most policies only at the margins, if at all. 
Their interventions are far too infrequent and timid.281 The 
                                                                                                     
 273. Compare McNeal, supra note 25, at 760 (observing that, “when 
triggered, legal accountability [through judicial review] imposes a high degree of 
externally based control over the targeted killing process”), with Craig, supra 
note 209, at 2364–65 (arguing that judicial review may reduce accountability by 
endowing the targeting process with “false legitimation”). 
 274. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (discussing the due 
process rights of a U.S. citizen being held as an enemy combatant). 
 275. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008) (recognizing 
habeas rights for detainees being held as enemy combatants at Guantanamo). 
 276. See supra notes 185–191 and accompanying text (discussing the ways 
in which the Court’s refusal to defer to the Executive branch in the Guantanamo 
cases altered national security policy). 
 277. See Chesney, Who May Be Held?, supra note 191, at 804 (discussing the 
relative ineffectiveness of offshore interrogation techniques for intelligence 
gathering). 
 278. See id. (noting the recent increase in lethal drone strikes). 
 279. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Releases Rules for Airstrike Killings of Terror 
Suspects, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/07/us/politics/us-releases-rules-for-airstrike-
killings-of-terror-suspects.html?mcubz=1 (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (discussing 
the declassification of the “drone strike playbook” and the drone program’s 
increased legitimacy as a result of the playbook’s release) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 280. See supra Part III.A.3 (describing the ways in which several Supreme 
Court decisions have increased scrutiny of the national security state’s 
activities).  
 281. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Drones Versus Their Critics: A Victory for 
 
WARFARE AS REGULATION 2009 
courts have declined to review the merits of drone strikes, either 
the substantive standards or procedures.  
The remaining institutional players are (1) United States 
and international public interest organizations with strong views 
about the targeted killing process and (2) foreign governments, 
who may see the process as affecting their national interests.282 
There is some evidence that relentless pressure by anti-targeting 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) caused the President 
and the agencies to rethink the targeted killing regulatory 
process—at least in the sense of introducing some 
transparency.283 In 2016, under pressure from NGOs, the Obama 
Administration finally released the official death toll—civilian 
and combatant—from drone strikes for the period of 2009–
2016.284 As with public interest groups that advocate for criminal 
justice reform, however, these NGOs face a steep uphill climb, 
and the progress they have made has been agonizingly slow in 
coming.285 
                                                                                                     
President Obama’s War Powers Legacy?, SMALL WARS J. (Oct. 14, 2015, 11:09 
PM), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/drones-versus-their-critics-a-victory-
for-president-obama’s-war-powers-legacy (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (noting 
U.S. courts’ general unwillingness to intervene in the targeted killing process) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). But see Craig, supra note 
209, at 2364–65 (noting that, when the Supreme Court has intervened in 
detention cases, it has resulted in an increase in public acceptance of the 
military detention system). 
 282. See Deeks, supra note 270, at 66–67 (observing that “a variety of 
foreign actors—including leaders, courts, citizens, and corporations—have the 
capacity to affect either the quantum of power within a single branch or the 
allocation of power among the three branches of the U.S. government, 
particularly in the area of intelligence activity”). 
 283. In public statements, President Obama was ambiguous about the 
influence of these organizations. See Jonathan Chait, Five Days That Shaped a 
Presidency, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 2, 2016, 9:00 PM), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/10/barack-obama-on-5-days-that-
shaped-his-presidency.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (observing that, while 
“the critique of drones has been important,” internal reforms were prompted by 
the “routineness” of agency attitudes toward targeted killing and the increase in 
drone strikes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 284. See Jaffer, supra note 2, at 13 (noting that, “over the seven-year period 
ending on December 31, 2015, ‘counterterrorism strikes outside the areas of 
active hostilities’ had killed between 64 and 116 noncombatants”). 
 285. See Dalal, supra note 99, at 105 (describing the imbalance between the 
lobbying power of “underrepresented and underfunded activist groups” and the 
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Most foreign governments have, so far, demonstrated little 
interest in influencing the targeting process. Many have, in fact, 
tacitly supported it by providing much of the intelligence used to 
select and locate targets.286 This includes U.S. allies and other 
nations who may face domestic terrorist attacks from the armed 
groups, and who therefore may see the United States as 
providing a global public good.287  
For obvious reasons, the governments of the nations where 
strikes occur have a more complex relationship with the process. 
They have a strong interest in the outcome of warfare conducted 
on their territory, and they theoretically have the power to make 
it difficult for the United States to carry out strikes: they could 
deny consent or publicly denounce the operations.288 So far, 
however, they have played a double game—often condemning, yet 
tolerating, or even assisting, targeting operations—because they 
face conflicting incentives.289 They are themselves conducting 
counterinsurgency operations against the same armed groups the 
United States is targeting, but perceived cooperation with the 
                                                                                                     
“powerful defense contractor lobby and the national security war hawks”); 
Dunlap, supra note 281 (noting that, despite “robust criticism by significant 
parts of the legal, academic, and political communities, neither the courts nor 
Congress have evinced much inclination to curtail or even publically scrutinize 
the Administration’s use of drones”). 
 286. See COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 230–34 (discussing Pakistan’s role in 
providing intelligence for, and taking credit for, certain drone strikes). 
 287. See Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1167 (2011) (positing that “the United States provides a 
public good through its efforts to combat terrorism”). 
 288. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Constitution Follows the Drone: Targeted 
Killings, Legal Constraints, and Judicial Safeguards, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 21, 29 (2015) (noting that “publically available information suggests that 
states [where strikes occur] have granted their consent, though at least 
Pakistani officials have recently made statements to the contrary”); McNeal, 
supra note 25, at 779–80 (noting that allies such as Pakistan and nations whose 
territory is used for military operations may, if they choose, exert pressure on 
the United States to alter targeting policy).  
 289. See, e.g., INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS & CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC 
(STANFORD LAW SCH.) GLOB. JUSTICE CLINIC (N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW), LIVING 
UNDER DRONES: DEATH, INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS FROM U.S. DRONE 
PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN 15–17 (2012) [hereinafter INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS & 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC] (discussing Pakistan’s divided role with respect to 
drone use in its northwestern territory). 
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United States may be politically poisonous, even among the 
population that does not support the insurgency.290 
As with the targets and victims of the strikes, the ability of 
NGOs and foreign governments to influence the targeting process 
depends on whether it is being used as part of, or in conjunction 
with, a progressive counterinsurgency strategy. Successful 
progressive counterinsurgency hinges on establishing 
legitimacy.291 If these institutional players regard drone strikes 
as illegitimate and are able and willing to advocate for that view 
with the relevant population, they could have a more substantial 
influence on the targeting process. 
Through 2016, however, that process has clearly been 
dominated by the agencies and private firms who carry out the 
program, with the direct involvement of the President himself, 
who, under current rules, must approve many personality 
strikes.292 The remaining institutional players are quite weak, 
especially compared to their power positions in the domestic 
regulatory context.293  
D. The Key Players’ Incentives 
1. The Regulating Agencies and Private Firms 
Because the agencies and private firms who conduct 
targeting operations also dominate the process of targeting as 
regulation, their incentives are the most important determinants 
of the direction that regulation is likely to take.  
                                                                                                     
 290. See COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 157, at 1–9 (“[I]f a 
population does not see outside forces as legitimate, this can undermine the 
legitimacy of the host-nation government trying to counter an insurgency.”). 
 291. See supra notes 154–163 and accompanying text (discussing the 
“kill-capture” method as a form of regulation). 
 292. See infra Part IV.A (discussing institutional reform as a possible 
method for altering national security bureaucrats’ current bent towards 
overregulation). 
 293. See ZEGART, supra note 63, at 21–28 (discussing the stark differences 
between domestic policy and national security agencies and the ways these 
differences weaken the influence of outside players). 
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This is where economic public choice theory is most useful. It 
is an influential view of regulation that developed in the 1960s 
and 1970s as a challenge to the then-prevailing assumption that 
agencies regulate in the public interest.294 Many core insights of 
public choice theory concern bureaucrats’ incentives. William 
Niskanen, in an influential 1971 study, proposed that 
bureaucrats seek to maximize their own utility by increasing 
their agencies’ budgets.295 Flowing from increased budgets were 
increases in “salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, 
power, patronage, [and the] output of the bureau.”296 Other 
theorists offered variations of Niskanen’s portrait of the rational 
bureaucrat.297 Some proposed that bureaucrats are also 
motivated by a zeal for the agency’s mission.298 Some seized on 
Justice Stephen Breyer’s observation that bureaucrats engaged in 
risk management tend to overregulate concerning rare, 
high-profile risks.299 But the common thread was that 
bureaucrats’ incentives drove them to overregulate.300  
                                                                                                     
 294. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 23, at 2–8 (tracing the development 
of economic public choice theory from its inception to present day). 
 295. See NISKANEN, supra note 66, at 39 (“It is impossible for any one 
bureaucrat to act in the public interest, because of the limits on his information 
and the conflicting interests of others, regardless of his personal motives.”); 
Benjamin H. Barton, Harry Potter and the Half-Crazed Bureaucracy, 104 MICH. 
L. REV. 1523, 1525 (2006) (observing that popular fantasy author J.K. Rowling, 
in Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince, “depict[s] a Ministry of Magic run by 
self-interested bureaucrats bent on increasing and protecting their power, often 
to the detriment of the public at large”); see also William A. Niskanen, 
Nonmarket Decision Making: The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy, 58 AM. 
ECON. REV. 293, 293–94 (1968) (discussing how bureaucrats maximize utility). 
The figure of the empire-building bureaucrat has had lasting influence in the 
public imagination as well. 
 296. NISKANEN, supra note 66, at 38. 
 297. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 23, at 4–5 (describing the modern 
expansion of Niskanen’s model to include a broader range of players and 
structures). 
 298. See DeMuth & Ginsburg, White House Review, supra note 26, at 1081–
82 (noting the challenge in using traditional social cost and benefit analyses 
given agencies’ tendency to favor their own mission). 
 299. See BREYER, supra note 24, at 9–10; (describing the risk assessment 
process and the potential for different risks to arise due to regulations); 
Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 121, 142–43 (2016). 
 300. Although Niskanen focused on the inefficiency produced by 
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Indeed, although many public choice theorists simply 
advocated for better or more efficient regulation, the field 
generally had an antiregulatory bent.301 Murray Weidenbaum, an 
influential member of Ronald Reagan’s 1980 campaign team, 
flipped conventional wisdom on its head, arguing that business 
firms actually represented the general public interest (as proxies 
for consumers) and that environmentalists were a “special 
interest group.”302 In fact, one popular version of capture theory 
during the 1970s and 1980s was not the now-familiar one about 
regulated private firms manipulating regulating bureaucrats to 
their advantage:303 instead, it told the story of public interest 
groups working hand-in-hand with zealous, prestige-seeking 
agency bureaucrats to overregulate the hapless private sector at 
the public’s expense.304 
                                                                                                     
bureaucratic incentives, this became conflated, in the minds of reformers, with 
the assumption that these bureaucrats were, at the same time, overregulating. 
See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the 
Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1263 (2006) (criticizing agency 
regulation and calling for a reform of the Office of Management and Budget’s 
review). 
 301. See id. at 1261–62 (“OMB’s advocates were frank that its primary 
function was to create a ‘rebuttable presumption against regulation’ in order to 
curb agencies’ supposed instincts to overregulate.”).  
 302. RICHARD REVESZ & MICHAEL LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY 22–23, 
163–64 (2009). 
 303. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 300, at 1284 (“In [capture theory’s] 
classic form . . . [i]n order to secure favorable regulations, the interest 
group . . . will aggressively lobby committee members and provide support, 
financial or otherwise, for the members’ reelection efforts. Those committee 
members will then pressure the agencies to enact favorable regulations.”). 
 304. See id. at 1264–65 (discussing Reagan’s supporters’ promotion of 
centralized review of agency decision-making in order to promote a “coordinated 
and cost-effective regulatory state” and to curb excessive regulation); DeMuth & 
Ginsburg, White House Review, supra note 26, at 1081–82 (arguing that 
rule-makers should be held accountable to the President for costs and benefits of 
their rules because this would “force regulators to confront problems of covert 
redistribution and overzealous pursuit of agency goals, which experience has 
shown to be common in regulatory programs”); Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2279 (2001) (“Proponents of [Reagan’s 
executive review process] stressed the need . . . to guard against regulatory 
failures—in particular, excessive regulatory costs imposed by single-mission 
agencies with ties to special interest groups and congressional committees.”). 
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These conservative anti-regulatory public choice theorists 
had domestic market and quality-of-life regulation in mind when 
they developed their critiques.305 As it turned out, many of their 
approaches fell apart under scrutiny or had poor success at 
predicting actual agency behavior in those areas.306 For example, 
due to collective action problems, public interest groups seeking 
benefits for the general public are frequently outgunned by 
narrow business interests when influencing agency regulation.307 
And those business interests are likely to favor less regulation.308 
Moreover, as Daryl Levinson has argued, domestic agencies do 
not always behave as empire-building, budget-maximizers—in 
fact, they actively avoid regulating in some instances.309 
However, there is plenty of evidence that regulation by 
national security bureaucrats is different—that the 1970s fable of 
the empire-building, overregulating bureaucrat urged on by a 
small group of pro-regulatory private firms is, in the unique 
national security context, accurate. First, analysts of the national 
security state, some of whom served in it, describe its bureaucrats 
as motivated, even obsessed with, expanding their agencies’ 
budgets, authority, autonomy, and prestige.310 These bureaucrats 
                                                                                                     
 305. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 300, at 1289 (criticizing agencies for 
failing to prioritize health and safety in rulemaking). 
 306. See id. at 1287–300 (discussing studies and analyses that call into 
question fundamental tenets of public choice theory relating to domestic 
regulation). 
 307. See id. at 1288–89 (noting that “if any group has disproportionate 
access to the administrative state, it is industry”). But see Christopher C. 
DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rationalism in Regulation, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
877, 910 (2010) (arguing that this analysis “obscur[es] the inconvenient fact that 
environmentalists and consumers . . . have managed to organize themselves into 
highly effective lobbying groups”). 
 308. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 300, at 1282–304 (arguing that the 
public choice assumptions about bureaucratic incentives often do not hold up 
when the behavior of quality-of-life regulators is examined). 
 309. See Levinson, supra note 12, at 932–34 (discussing empire-building in 
the context of non-elected government officials). 
 310. National security bureaucrats see these goals as interrelated. See 
SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 51 (quoting a former CIA official’s observation that, 
“[i]f you get the budget, then you control the decisions”); Sales, supra note 70, at 
282 (arguing that “[i]ntelligence agencies seek to maximize their influence over 
senior policymakers” and “autonomy—i.e., the ability to pursue agency priorities 
without outside interference”). 
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believe that the most effective way to do so in most situations is 
to advocate for aggressive intelligence collection and the 
muscular, “hard-hitting” military options.311 They are therefore 
incentivized both to inflate threats and to conclude that their 
agency’s particular weaponry and skill sets are the best tools for 
meeting those threats.312 They gain bigger budgets, more 
authority, and greater prestige when their weapons and 
personnel are deployed.313 
Second, national security bureaucrats are true believers in 
their agencies’ missions, which today is counterterrorism.314 
Attempts to introduce a secondary, rights-protecting mission into 
such agencies by adding an office of civil liberties, for example, 
typically fail as the rights-protecting bureaucrats are redirected 
toward fulfilling the agency’s primary counterterrorism 
mission.315  
                                                                                                     
 311. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 19 (noting the government’s, and 
particularly the President’s, fear of appearing “soft” or “weak” in military 
policy); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND 
POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 65–66 (1957) (describing “the military 
mind” as “skeptical of institutional devices designed to prevent war,” 
particularly including those of international law).  
 312. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 19–22 (discussing threat inflation in 
military policy); SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 51 (quoting a former CIA official’s 
observation that “everybody thinks that whatever toys they control are the toys 
that need to be used and therefore you need more of them”). 
 313. See infra notes 339–352 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for 
the drone program’s prevalence). 
 314. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 26–27 (noting the remarkable unanimity 
among national security bureaucrats, especially at the upper levels). 
 315. See Shirin Sinnar, Institutionalizing Rights in the National Security 
Executive, 50 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 289, 294–300 (2015) 
(detailing the prevalence and function of internal rights oversight offices); see 
also Alston, supra note 22, at 283 (concluding that, with respect to the drone 
program, “[t]he CIA’s internal control mechanisms, including its Inspector 
General, have had no discernible impact”); Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating 
Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 
21–24 (2010) (observing that, when an agency is assigned two conflicting 
missions, one of the missions will usually swallow the other); J.R. DeShazo & 
Jody Freeman, Public Agencies As Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2220 
(2005) (“Agencies frequently resolve . . . interstatutory conflicts by prioritizing 
their primary mission and letting their secondary obligations fall by the 
wayside.”). 
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Third, national security bureaucrats are incentivized to take 
the approach to risk management that was believed to afflict 
domestic regulators in the 1970s: they overregulate with respect 
to high-profile, low probability risks.316 For national security 
bureaucrats, the paradigmatic high-profile risk is the 
mass-casualty terrorist attack.317 Unlike domestic bureaucrats at 
agencies like the EPA or the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), however, the national security bureaucrat has greater 
difficulty externalizing costs to the regulated entities. When the 
EPA imposes emissions caps, it spends some money conducting 
the rulemaking process, but most of the costs of regulating are 
borne by the polluters.318 National security bureaucrats, in 
contrast, need to spend much more money to regulate. They 
spend billions on costly equipment and skilled personnel. 
Moreover, when they regulate through the use of force, the costs 
may include, not only the lives of noncombatant civilians, but also 
the lives of service members and private contractors.319 
The primary defense mechanism against the potential 
prestige threat created by these costs is to hide them. Within the 
national security bureaucracy, there are strong incentives to bury 
or ignore policy failures—from continuing to pay for expensive 
weapons that do not work320 to undercounting collateral deaths 
                                                                                                     
 316. See supra notes 299–300 and accompanying text (discussing the 
bureaucratic tendency to overregulate in favor of an agency’s mission). 
 317. See BOBBITT, supra note 55, at 18 (discussing the United States’ fear of 
terrorist attacks which has resulted in short-term action rather than long-term 
strategic planning). 
 318. See Reitze, supra note 46, at 375–76. (noting that while some of the 
financial burden of regulations is shifted to the consumer, market forces limit 
the extent to which the burden can be shared). One large, catastrophic, 
exception is climate change resulting from externalizing the costs of carbon 
dioxide emissions. 
 319. See Linda J. Bilmes, The Financial Legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan: 
How Wartime Spending Decisions Will Constrain Future National Security 
Budgets 1 (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working Paper RWP13-006, 2013), 
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubI
d=8956&type=WPN (calculating that “[t]he Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, 
taken together, will be the most expensive wars in U.S. history—totaling 
somewhere between $4 to $6 trillion”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 320. See COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 168–88 (describing massive spending 
on expensive and ineffective equipment for targeting operations). 
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from the use of force321 to conducting missions “off the books.”322 
Scaling back the level of regulation is rarely considered because it 
is viewed as an admission of failure, which actually increases the 
threat to bureaucratic prestige.323 
Nonetheless, under some conditions, depending on the degree 
of public attention to the costs of war activities, the national 
security bureaucracy will face significant pressure to scale back 
the level of regulation.324 Uses of force that result in the deaths of 
service members are especially likely to become unpopular over 
time.325  
However, the rational national security bureaucracy, given 
its incentives, will first respond to this type of threat to its 
authority and prestige by shifting to a different type of 
regulation—i.e., a different mode of warfare—if possible, rather 
than scaling back the level of regulation.326 For example, in 
response to increased scrutiny of military detention at 
Guantanamo via habeas proceedings, transfers to Guantanamo 
                                                                                                     
 321. See infra notes 353–367 and accompanying text (discussing ways in 
which agencies overregulate using drone strikes). 
 322. See Andrew de Grandpre & Shawn Snow, The U.S. Military’s Stats on 
Deadly Airstrikes are Wrong. Thousands Have Gone Unreported, MIL. TIMES 
(Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-
military/2017/02/05/the-u-s-military-s-stats-on-deadly-airstrikes-are-wrong-
thousands-have-gone-unreported/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (discussing the 
“potentially thousands” of lethal airstrikes that the U.S. military has failed to 
publically disclose) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 323. See Dalal, supra note 99, at 105 (“[C]hanging course implies that the 
existing course is incorrect—an admission of failure that might expose the 
agency to unwanted scrutiny and negatively implicate the agency’s top brass.”). 
 324. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in 
which public opinion has contributed to the regulation of the national security 
state).  
 325. See Gregory P. Noone, The War Powers Resolution and Public Opinion, 
45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 145, 147–48 (2012) (observing that, “[n]o matter how 
popular an exercise of American power may be at the beginning, support will 
erode,” and that the “duration of the conflict and the number of casualties 
directly impacts the level of support”). 
 326. See Chesney, Who May Be Held?, supra note 191, at 804 (observing 
that, “like squeezing a balloon, . . . when one of these coercive powers becomes 
constrained in new, more restrictive ways, the displaced pressure to 
incapacitate may simply find expression through one of the alternative 
mechanisms”). 
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virtually stopped, and the use of targeted killing, and detention 
was largely outsourced to foreign governments.327 Interagency 
rivalry within the national security state also incentivizes 
national security bureaucrats to find a different means of 
regulating when the costs of one method become too apparent. If 
one agency faces criticism for its regulating, another agency will 
be happy to point out that its method of regulating is more 
effective and efficient.328 And in general, the national security 
bureaucrat is far more fearful about being blamed by the public 
for a catastrophic failure than for spending too much money.329 
This fear provides another incentive to inflate threats.330 
Fourth, national security bureaucrats work side-by-side with 
private contractors whose incentives are slightly different—they 
center more on profit than prestige—but also point in the 
direction of overregulation.331 Many of these firms have worked 
with the national security bureaucracy for decades.332 Private 
firms profit when the national security state uses their products 
or services, of course. But the revolving door between public and 
private333 means that contractors—Edward Snowden 
                                                                                                     
 327. See id. (discussing the pressure the U.S. government has faced over 
military detention and its impact on military strategy). 
 328. See ZEGART, supra note 63, at 38 (“[N]ational security agencies have 
powerful incentives to worry about the design and operation of organizations 
other than their own . . . . [B]ureaucratic interconnectedness guarantees that 
changes to any one organization will affect others.”). 
 329. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 19–20 (discussing the incentives for 
national security bureaucrats to exaggerate existing threats and to create new 
ones to protect themselves against public backlash in the event of an attack). 
 330. See id. (concluding that a rational actor in the national security 
bureaucracy would inflate risks for this reason). 
 331. See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 
748–49 (2010) (discussing contractors’ motivations to maximize remuneration 
and prestige). 
 332. See COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 34–38 (describing one example of a 
Canadian defense contractor appointed by President Carter who has exerted 
significant influence on U.S. defense policy in the subsequent decades); 
DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE, supra note 27, at 23 (discussing the 
U.S. military’s increased use of private contractors in the decades since the 
Vietnam War). 
 333. According to a 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, 
fifty-two major defense contractors employed 86,181 of the 1,857,004 former 
military and civilian personnel who had left DOD service since 2001, including 
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notwithstanding—are likely to possess the national security 
bureaucrats’ qualities—zeal for the counterterrorism mission, 
prestige-seeking, tendency to inflate threats, and belief that 
aggressive intelligence collection and use of force are the best 
solutions.334 And even if the contractor does not share these 
qualities with the bureaucrat, it is in her financial interest to act 
as though she does.335 In addition, the revolving door provides an 
“incentive[] [for regulators] to expand the market demand for 
services they would be providing when they exit the 
government.”336  
In light of these incentives, it is clear why the drone program 
became a centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. In 
theory, drones are an ideal weapon of war because they reduce 
the costs of regulating.337 First, drones impose fewer direct costs 
on the national security bureaucracy than other methods of 
warfare.338 The drones themselves are now pricey pieces of 
                                                                                                     
2,345 former DOD officials hired between 2004 and 2006. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-485, DEFENSE CONTRACTING: POST-GOVERNMENT 
EMPLOYMENT OF FORMER DOD OFFICIALS NEEDS GREATER TRANSPARENCY 4 
(2008). See DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE, supra note 27, at 118–19 
& n.100 (discussing the high numbers of former DOD employees who go to work 
for military contractors, and observing that “many of the companies that won 
contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan boasted top brass or former members of 
Special Forces teams as corporate board members or senior executives”). 
Dickinson points out that, because Congress repealed a statute requiring that 
DOD report turnover numbers, the percentage of former DOD employees 
working for national security contractors is likely much higher than the GAO 
number. Id. at 119 n.100. 
 334. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE, supra note 27, at 118–20. 
 335. See Michaels, supra note 331, at 748–49 (“Enticements of remuneration 
or prestige may be enough to influence even apolitical contractors, leading them 
to tell the agency chiefs what they want to hear. That is, the contractors’ advice 
is colored by their desire to be ‘go-to’ contractors on other, or continuing, 
programs.”). 
 336. Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 
1269 (2015). 
 337. See Tung Yin, Game of Drones: Defending Against Drone Terrorism, 2 
TEX. A&M L. REV. 635, 646–47 (2015) (comparing the cost advantage of drone 
usage over that of a manned aircraft as well as the continued benefits of drone 
usage as technology advances). 
 338. See id. at 639–40 (comparing the high cost of a typical fighter plane 
with that of the much cheaper drone that serves virtually the same function). 
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equipment,339 but their use dramatically lowers costs in many 
important ways.340 No American service members’ lives are put at 
immediate risk.341 No enemy territory need be occupied and 
controlled.342 In other words, the death, property destruction, and 
other harms that may result from drone strikes are externalized 
to foreign citizens and communities.343 And in part because the 
drone strikes occur in remote areas, intense media scrutiny and 
high-profile backlash have been slow to gain traction.344 
Moreover, drone strikes boost agency prestige by appearing, 
at least, to reduce costs overall. When strong intelligence and the 
right opportunity overlap, the drone operator may cleanly and 
swiftly eliminate an enemy without the civilian deaths and 
property damage other types of attacks typically cause.345 By 
reducing such costs, the national security bureaucracy gains even 
more prestige—it can credibly claim to be achieving crucial 
military objectives while honoring the core principles of 
international humanitarian law.346 Indeed, the glossary of the 
                                                                                                     
 339. The “backbone” of the drone fleet is the Reaper, which costs $30 million 
per copy to produce, and each copy costs $5 million per year to maintain. See 
COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 177. But they are being replaced by much more 
expensive models. See id. at 253–55 (describing the newest generation of drones 
that cost from $140 to $300 million per copy). 
 340. See Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Tests Obama’s Principles 
and Will, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-
qaeda.html?mcubz=1 (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (listing the other costs 
associated with drones) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 341. See Judah A. Druck, Droning on: The War Powers Resolution and the 
Numbing Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 209, 211 
(2012) (“[L]ess is at stake when drones, not human lives, are on the front lines, 
limiting the potential motivation of a legislator, judge, or antiwar activist to 
check presidential action. As a result, the level of nonexecutive involvement in 
foreign military affairs has decreased.”). 
 342. Id.  
 343. Id.  
 344. Id. 
 345. See, e.g., Radsan & Murphy, supra note 38, at 1203 (describing the 
capabilities of drones to zero in on narrow targets from a significant distance). 
 346. See id. at 1204 (“Over time, a consensus will likely evolve that targeted 
killing of suspected terrorists under some circumstances is legal under 
[International Humanitarian Law].”); Becker & Shane, supra note 340 (quoting 
former DNI Blair’s statement that the drone program was “the politically 
advantageous thing to do—low cost, no U.S. casualties, gives the appearance of 
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drone bureaucracy is filled with triumphalist terms like 
“jackpot”—when the intended target is killed—and 
“touchdown”—when a target’s phone is neutralized after a drone 
strike.347 And after the Bush Administration’s detention policies 
caused massive legal and public relations problems,348 drone 
technology enabled the shift away from capture to targeting.349 
The program’s perceived effectiveness in killing members of 
enemy armed forces helped restore morale at the CIA, which was 
still suffering a crisis of confidence from past intelligence 
disasters.350 In sum, with the drone program, the national 
security bureaucrats’ agencies gained prestige, a morale boost 
among its personnel, and a larger budget.351 Contractors who 
supply the drones and the staff to pilot them got bigger 
contracts.352 
The problem, however, is that agencies with the incentive to 
overregulate will, in fact, overregulate.353 In the targeted killing 
context, the national security bureaucrat is incentivized to 
overregulate because he maximizes his agency’s prestige by 
producing enough targets and conducting enough strikes to 
justify its budget and maintain the program’s primacy as a 
counterterrorism tool.354 The demand for targets creates a 
market, which the intelligence community and private 
                                                                                                     
toughness, . . . plays well domestically, and . . . is unpopular only in other 
countries”). 
 347. See Betsy Reed, Preface of JEREMY SCAHILL, THE ASSASSINATION 
COMPLEX: INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT’S SECRET DRONE WARFARE PROGRAM ix (2016) 
(referring to terms Scahill uncovered in his investigative drone research which 
were then used in this book to illustrate U.S. drone tactics).  
 348. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (describing the litigation 
challenging the legality of military detention at Guantanamo Bay). 
 349. See SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 5 (highlighting drones’ ability to aim at 
targets from remote distances without need of support from ground forces). 
 350. See id. (referencing past intelligence failures like September 11). 
 351. See id. (describing a boost in morale). 
 352. COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 173. 
 353. See Jaffer, supra note 2, at 7 (“Eight years ago the targeted-killing 
campaign required a legal and bureaucratic infrastructure, but now that 
infrastructure will demand a targeted-killing campaign.”). 
 354.  Id.; COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 223 (describing how officials loosened 
targeting rules to increase the number of targets and therefore justify the 
program’s budget). 
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contractors in turn have an incentive to supply.355 This 
overregulating bureaucracy has an incentive to nominate targets 
or attack individuals based on insufficient intelligence;356 to use 
drones to attack targets on the kill list when a personnel 
operation would be more effective;357 to establish a low threshold 
for conducting signature strikes;358 or to attack the target when 
the risks of civilian casualties are likely to be disproportionate to 
the military necessity.359 If the civilian death toll is in fact 
disproportionate, or strikes fail to kill an intended target, the 
bureaucracy has an incentive to counter this prestige threat by 
labeling those killed as “enemies” and finding intelligence to 
support such a determination if necessary.360 In general, the 
entire bureaucracy is incentivized to keep its decisions as secret 
as possible.361 
                                                                                                     
 355. See SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 104 (quoting a former anonymous 
JSCOC drone operator’s observation that, “[b]ecause there is an ever-increasing 
demand for more targets to be added to the kill list, the mentality is ‘[j]ust keep 
feeding the beast’”). 
 356. See id. at 118 (discussing observations from high-level participants in 
the drone program that SIGINT (signals intelligence), is “an inferior form of 
intelligence [that], . . . account[s] for more than half the intelligence collected on 
targets” and that there is an overreliance on less-reliable partner-nation 
intelligence); COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 201–04 (discussing overreliance on 
intelligence provided by rival armed groups seeking to weaken each other). 
 357. See id. at 114–18 (noting that targeted killing “short-circuits” the 
“find-fix-finish-exploit-analyze” intelligence cycle because the dead target cannot 
be exploited for intelligence). 
 358. See Becker & Shane, supra note 340 (reporting the State Department 
officials’ “joke . . . that when the C.I.A. sees ‘three guys doing jumping jacks,’ the 
agency thinks it is a terrorist training camp”). 
 359. See Guiora, supra note 204, at 242 (describing the burden of 
distinguishing combatants from civilians and the necessity of making this 
distinction prior to carrying out an attack). 
 360. See Becker & Shane, supra note 340 (reporting that the U.S. 
government “counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants . . . 
unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent”). See 
generally SCAHILL, supra note 2527, at 47–48. 
 361. See Jack Serle, Obama Drone Casualty Numbers a Fraction of Those 
Recorded by the Bureau, BUREAU INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (July 1, 2016), 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2016/07/01/obama-drone-casualty-
numbers-fraction-recorded-bureau/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (noting the 
impetus to keep drone strike information secret because leaked government 
records indicated the U.S. was sometimes unaware of the identities of people 
they were killing, which would reflect negatively on drone operations) (on file 
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And indeed, critics at NGOs, in academia, and elsewhere 
have long contended that the drone program overregulates in 
precisely these ways.362 In other words, it has many hidden 
costs.363 Strikes typically kill far fewer enemies and far more 
civilians than the government will admit;364 they inflict other 
kinds of harm on the populations living in the areas where 
strikes occur;365 and they have become recruiting tools for the 
very armed groups they are attempting to disrupt.366 In more 
general terms, its critics contend, the drone bureaucracy 
systematically underestimates the long-term costs to America’s 
interests when calculating the costs and benefits of adding a 
name to the kill list or launching a strike.367  
Although secrecy makes it difficult to assess the accuracy of 
critics’ claims,368 they are more or less consistent with the 
                                                                                                     
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 362. See id. (detailing the discrepancy between the number of casualties the 
U.S. government reported and the much higher casualty numbers independent 
entities documented). 
 363. See id. (suggesting that there are more costs to drone operations than 
the public is aware of due to lack of government transparency).  
 364. See id. (describing how the U.S. is sometimes unaware of who they are 
killing); see also Jaffer, supra note 2, at 16–18 (explaining how drones often 
destroy innocent civilians in their private dwellings or even in open public 
spaces). 
 365. See Jaffer, supra note 2, at 16–18 (depicting the incessant drone 
attacks that destroyed homes, cars, and public spaces and the resulting trauma 
experienced in the Pakistani communities). See generally INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS & 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC, supra note 289 (reporting the misleading 
characteristics of the U.S. government narrative on drone usage and drone 
strikes); COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 225–26 (noting that life in North 
Waziristan, where drone attacks were frequent, had changed such that 
weddings and funerals no longer took place because people were afraid to 
gather); id. at 227 (describing frequent drone attacks as “devastat[ing] the life of 
the society as comprehensively as if it had been subjected to a World War II-
style carpet bombing”). 
 366. See Jaffer, supra note 2, at 15–16 (describing how drone attacks 
increased anti-American sentiment in Pakistan and Yemen). 
 367. See, e.g., Becker & Shane, supra note 340 (quoting former United 
States Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair’s statement that “any 
damage” the drone program “does to the national interest only shows up over 
the long term”); Jaffer, supra note 2, at 17–18.  
 368. See McNeal, supra note 25, at 756 (“[O]ne of the most obvious 
challenges to the public debate over targeted killings is the lack of agreement 
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above-described warfare-as-regulation model’s predictions. 
Furthermore, unless the criticism can be successfully refuted, it 
could put the national security bureaucrat, and the President 
himself, in a bind.369 A drone program in which attacks routinely 
fail to kill the enemy and which cause a disproportionate amount 
of civilian casualties would seriously damage the prestige of the 
agencies involved.370 At the same time, however, if the drone 
bureaucracy scaled back substantially the number of strikes to 
kill more actual enemies and fewer civilians, it would risk 
relinquishing its status as the crown jewel of counterinsurgency 
strategy.371 Either way, an entire bureaucracy invested in the 
program’s dominance and success would suffer a devastating loss 
of prestige and power.372 The Obama Administration’s response to 
this prestige threat was to emphasize the substantive limits it 
had imposed on drone strikes as a matter of policy and the 
procedural aspects of the targeting process—its sheer complexity, 
the numerous factors weighed in decision-making, and the 
number and type of decision makers involved, including the 
President himself.373 Leaks and the Drone Playbook revealed 
that, over time, targeted killing procedures became quite 
formalized and robust.374 The Administration emphasized that 
                                                                                                     
about even the number of persons killed.”); Douglas Cox & Ramzi Kassem, Off 
the Record: The National Security Council, Drone Killings, and Historical 
Accountability, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 363, 364–65 (2014) (“Uncertainty over the 
legal standards for the drone killing program and a lack of transparency 
highlight the need for thorough documentation as a prerequisite for meaningful 
oversight and accountability.”).  
 369. Cf. McNeal, supra note 25, at 777 (arguing that “successes and failures” 
in targeting operations “are imputed directly to the President” because of his 
personal involvement in the process). 
 370. Id. at 778.  
 371. See Glennon, supra note 5, at 26 (suggesting any decrease in drone 
activity would risk the U.S. losing its foothold as a leader in drone counter 
insurgency efforts). 
 372. Id. 
 373. See generally Drone Playbook, supra note 25 (outlining the various 
roles governmental agencies and officers play in the drone decision-making 
process).  
 374. See McNeal, supra note 25, at 701 (observing that kill lists “are vetted 
through an elaborate bureaucratic process that allows for verification of 
intelligence information before a person is added”). See generally Drone 
Playbook, supra note 25.  
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multiple agencies are involved in producing and analyzing the 
intelligence supporting “nomination” and strikes decisions.375 
These procedures require either unanimous approval from the 
heads of several agencies or approval from the President, who 
also must personally approve certain strike decisions.376 And 
importantly, agencies insist that the targeting process does 
include consideration of the more long-term costs and benefits its 
critics accuse it of ignoring—the effect of the strike on U.S. 
reputation, whether it will weaken or strengthen the enemy 
groups, and the intelligence value of capturing the target 
instead.377 
However, these features of the process likely do little to 
diminish the bureaucrats’ and contractors’ general incentives to 
overregulate. Agencies “tend to choose the goals that are more 
easily measured so they can demonstrate progress, . . . [and t]his 
often means taking an approach that focuses on short-term 
concerns with tangible outputs, as opposed to long-term effects 
that might be harder to predict and quantify . . . .”378 In the 
targeting process, “enemies killed in action” is as tangible an 
output as they come. “Jackpots” and “touchdowns” are what the 
bureaucracy wants to report to outsiders, not the careful 
weighing of long-term foreign relations impacts.379 The long-term 
objectives, such as the costs to U.S. reputation or blowback, are 
much harder to measure and are therefore less likely to be 
prioritized in the assessments leading up to a final strike 
decision. 
                                                                                                     
 375. McNeal, supra note 25, at 701–29. See generally Drone Playbook, supra 
note 25, § 3.  
 376. See Drone Playbook, supra note 25, §§ 2.E.1, 3.E.1, 3.E.2 (describing 
the situations in which the President must make the ultimate decision whether 
to approve lethal action against an individual). 
 377. See McNeal, supra note 25, at 724–25 (quoting the military doctrinal 
requirements that must be weighed as a part of the “target validation 
consideration” process). 
 378.  Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the 
Department of Justice, supra note 36, at 310. 
 379. See supra notes 341–350 and accompanying text (discussing the remote 
nature of drone strikes and the resulting lack of media attention); see also Reed, 
supra note 347, at ix (noting the terminology used in drone strikes). 
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Given the incentives and power dynamics in the targeting 
regulatory process, then, it is quite doubtful that this robust 
internal deliberative process—though designed with the best 
intentions—has limited the overall momentum of the drone 
program.380 The rational national security bureaucrat is more 
likely, again, to change the means of regulation rather than 
reduce its level.381 For example, there is evidence that the 
number of personality strikes has dropped, but the number of 
signature strikes, which do not require the same lengthy 
deliberative process, has increased.382 It is more likely that such 
reforms help legitimize the program by endowing it with the 
empty vessel of “due process,” through which the same incentives 
are ultimately channeled.383  
2. The Other Players 
As discussed above, the Congress and the public are 
relatively weak institutional players with respect to national 
security regulating because, in most situations, they lack the 
information and expertise to evaluate its success.384 The 
President possesses more power, but also faces some 
disadvantages in grappling with the national security 
bureaucracy.385 The courts have demonstrated the potential to 
influence the regulatory process, but have rarely exercised that 
influence.386 In addition, courts reviewing national security 
decision-making, in the absence of countervailing influences, may 
be vulnerable to capture by the agencies who are repeat players 
before them.387  
                                                                                                     
 380. See Chesney, Who May Be Held?, supra note 191, at 804 (noting that 
drone strikes have greatly increased over the last two years). 
 381. Supra note 326 and accompanying text. 
 382. See Jaffer, supra note 2, at 12–13 (describing the decision to expand a 
form of signature strikes to Yemen in 2012). 
 383. Supra notes 212–213 and accompanying text. 
 384. Supra notes 254–258 and accompanying text. 
 385. Supra notes 259–261 and accompanying text. 
 386. Supra notes 369–383 and accompanying text. 
 387. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More 
Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 67–68 (1991) (“[T]he same interest 
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However, there are rare situations in which a clear national 
security regulatory failure occurs that triggers increased pressure 
on the bureaucracy from the President, Congress and the 
public.388 The 9/11 attacks are the paradigmatic example of such a 
failure, but in the wake of 9/11, even minor failures can have 
enormous political effects.389 On Christmas Day, 2009, Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian with connections to al Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula, attempted to detonate plastic 
explosives taped to his leg while on board a flight from 
Amsterdam to Detroit.390 After his abortive attack, it emerged 
that Abdulmutallab had been allowed to board the flight despite 
being on the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), 
a database that gathers terrorism information from sensitive 
military and intelligence sources around the world and is 
managed by the National Counterterrorism Center.391 Admitting 
that there had been a “systemic failure,” President Obama “gave 
increased powers and responsibilities to the agencies that 
nominate individuals to the [watch] lists, putting pressure on 
them to add names.”392 Because Abdulmutallab had trained in 
Yemen, Obama also halted detainee transfers of Yemenis from 
Guantanamo, perhaps fearing the political disaster of a released 
                                                                                                     
groups that have an organizational advantage in collecting resources to 
influence legislators and agencies generally also have an organizational 
advantage in collecting resources to influence the courts.”); Marc Galanter, Why 
the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–104 (1974) (noting that repeat players have advantages 
over parties that utilize the judiciary less frequently). 
 388. See DONOHUE, supra note 119, at 2 (describing the Executive Branch’s 
typical response to a terrorist attack as (1) assuming that the government 
lacked information that it could have used to thwart the preceding attack (2) 
seeking an expansion of power). 
 389. See Anahad O’Connor & Eric Schmitt, Terror Attempt Seen as Man 
Tries to Ignite Device on Jet, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/26/us/26plane.html?mcubz=1 (last updated 
Jan. 9, 2010) (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) (discussing a prevented terrorist attack 
that spurred questions about plane security and the failures of the current 
system) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 390. Id.  
 391. Id.; SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 18–20. 
 392. SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 20. 
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detainee engaging in attacks.393 Congress, for its part, imposed 
new, onerous restrictions on Guantanamo transfers.394 
This example illustrates that the politics of national security, 
when they become salient, also tend to make overregulation more 
likely. In the absence of attacks, the public and Congress pay 
relatively little attention to regulation of national security 
activities.395 But when an attack occurs, or there is an increased 
perception of threats, the renewed interest is expressed almost 
exclusively in calls for more regulation.396 The President knows 
this and acts accordingly, whipping the national security state to 
regulate more aggressively.397 
V. Reforming Warfare As Regulation 
The warfare-as-regulation model of targeted killing reveals a 
regulatory environment in which pro-regulatory forces are 
incredibly strong and anti-regulatory forces are quite weak.398 It 
is a significant challenge to formulate proposals that may 
                                                                                                     
 393. See White House: No Detainees to Yemen for Now, USA TODAY (Jan. 5, 
2010), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-01-05-Yemen_N.htm (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2017) (justifying Obama’s decision to stop transfers out of 
Yemen because of bipartisan political scrutiny resulting from fears of increased 
terror activity amid prison releases in Yemen) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 394. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42143, WARTIME DETENTION PROVISIONS IN RECENT DEFENSE 
AUTHORIZATION LEGISLATION (2016), available at 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42143.pdf (describing legislative restrictions on 
releases of detainees from Guantanamo Bay). 
 395. Supra notes 255–258 and accompanying text. 
 396. DONOHUE, supra note 119, at 2 (observing that attacks almost always 
spur efforts to increase national security authority). 
 397. See Rebecca Ingber, The Obama War Powers Legacy and the Internal 
Forces that Entrench Executive Power, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 680, 686–87 (2016) 
(“[A] president inclined to make aggressive claims of power may be more 
willing . . . to circumvent some of the long-standing norms and institutional 
features of the executive branch in order to consolidate political control for the 
purpose of effectuating those executive power ends.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 398. The imbalance may not be as large in other areas of national security 
regulation, such as domestic surveillance, where the American people may sense 
that they are directly affected. See generally Rascoff, supra note 70, at 662–63. 
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successfully compensate for this imbalance and the incentives to 
overregulate it produces.399 But there is substantial value in 
simply recognizing the existence and origins of this imbalance.400 
Doing so should help reformers focus on the subset of possible 
changes that are most likely to address the imbalance—the 
institutional, doctrinal, and political tools that could, in this 
context, have an anti-regulatory effect.401 
Scholars have grappled with a similar imbalance in criminal 
justice regulation and some of their reform proposals are 
applicable to, or have already been proposed for, the targeted 
killing context.402 In other ways, however, the targeted killing 
process—and national security regulating more generally—
presents unique challenges that require emphasizing different 
tools.403 Reform proposals tend to fall into three categories—
(1) institutional reforms, such as separating functions within an 
agency or the reassignment of potentially conflicting missions to 
different agencies; (2) accountability mechanisms, such as 
external or internal review; and (3) political engagement, such as 
lobbying efforts or providing lawmakers, the President, and the 
public with information that may soften their pro-regulatory 
views.404 
A. Institutional Changes 
Because national security bureaucrats operate within a 
context in which their incentives point in the direction of 
overregulation, altering that context through institutional reform 
is one potentially effective way of altering the incentives the 
context creates. In the criminal justice realm, Professor Rachel 
Barkow has proposed that the incentives for prosecutors to 
                                                                                                     
 399. See supra Part IV (describing the incentives that lead to the 
imbalance).  
 400. See supra Part III.B. (describing the benefits of the warfare-as-
regulation paradigm). 
 401. See infra Parts V.A–C (discussing these possible changes). 
 402. Infra notes 412–417 and accompanying text. 
 403. Id. 
 404. Supra Parts IV.A–C.  
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overregulate can be mitigated through internal separation of 
functions within agencies—specifically, that prosecutors “who 
make investigative and advocacy decisions should be separated 
from those who make adjudicative decisions.”405 Barkow also 
observed that the Department of Justice’s “tough-on-crime” 
mission influences and distorts its clemency, forensics, and 
corrections decisions.406 The most effective institutional reform, 
Barkow argues, would be re-assigning these functions to other 
agencies or creating new independent agencies to carry them 
out.407 
The targeted killing process is enshrouded in secrecy, but it 
is characterized, to some extent, by separation of functions within 
agencies and the assignment of different tasks to different 
agencies. Many agencies may be involved in gathering 
intelligence on a single person.408 The NSA provides the “signals 
intelligence”—e.g., tracking targets’ locations through phone 
numbers and SIM cards—while the CIA and military intelligence 
agencies are more likely to provide human intelligence.409 Joint 
Special Operations Command (within DOD) and the CIA (the 
“operating agencies”) conduct the strikes with the assistance of 
private contractors.410 This division of labor does avoid pro-
regulatory incentives that would exist if one agency official both 
collected intelligence on an individual and approved the strike 
                                                                                                     
 405. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: 
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 874 (2009) [hereinafter 
Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law]. 
 406. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the 
Department of Justice, supra note 36, at 277–78. 
 407. See id. at 334–35 (suggesting the formation of direct lines of 
communication with Congress and the media without requiring approval from 
the Department of Justice would better secure political support); see also Jon D. 
Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 
520 (2015) (“[T]he constitutional tradition of employing rivalrous institutional 
counterweights to promote good governance, political accountability, and 
compliance with the rule of law.”). 
 408. See generally McNeal, supra note 25, at 701–30. 
 409. Id.; see SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 22–40 (arguing that the lists relied 
on in assessing individuals are over-inclusive). 
 410. See generally McNeal, supra note 25, at 730–48. 
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decision—or even if a single agency conducted the process from 
start to finish.411  
The nomination and approval process also culminates in 
inter-agency review designed to include high-level input and 
perspectives from several different agencies, any of which may 
nominate an individual for targeting—the “nominating 
agencies.”412 The NCTC coordinates information on nominees, 
which it organizes and presents to a “deputies committee” made 
up of the seconds-in-command at the DOJ and the major agencies 
within the national security state.413 The nominee can be subject 
to a strike only after consideration by a “principals committee” of 
nominating agencies and other officials on the National Security 
Council.414 If the principals are unanimous, the nominee is added 
to the kill list.415 The President must approve an addition to the 
list when the principals committee is not unanimous or the target 
is a U.S. citizen.416 Personality strikes are executed by either the 
DOD’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), the CIA, or 
the two in combination—with government personnel working 
alongside private contractors.417 
However, there are several reasons why these features are 
not likely to constrain the over-regulatory dynamics. They have 
little potential to alter bureaucratic incentives.418 Checks and 
balances are “mechanisms designed to prevent action that 
                                                                                                     
 411. The CIA’s drone program may be characterized by this problem, 
however, when the agency gathers most of the intelligence for strikes that it 
also executes. Id. at 707–08. 
 412. These agencies include the State Department, the Treasury, the 
Defense Department, the Justice Department, the Department of Homeland 
Security, the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Counterterrorism 
Center. See generally Drone Playbook, supra note 25, §§ 19, 3.D. 
 413. These agencies are the Department of State, DOD, JCS, DOJ, DHS, 
DNI, CIA, and NCTC. Id. § 3.D.2. 
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nominee to be forwarded to the principals. See generally McNeal, supra note 25, 
at 727.  
 415. Drone Playbook, supra note 25, § 3.E.1. 
 416. Id. § 3.E.2. 
 417. COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 32. 
 418. See supra Part III.D (discussing incentives among key players in the 
drone regulatory scheme). 
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oversteps legitimate boundaries by requiring the cooperation of 
actors with different institutional interests to produce an 
authoritative decision.”419 Of the principals who ultimately 
approve a decision to add a name to the kill list, only the State 
and Treasury Secretaries head agencies that do not have 
counterterrorism as their primary institutional missions.420 But 
their involvement in the process is unlikely to be influential in 
most cases.421 These agencies do not typically collect intelligence, 
and the intelligence on the kill list nominees is compiled and 
presented by a single agency, the NCTC.422 In other words, the 
State and Treasury Secretaries must generally rely only on other 
agencies’ presentation of the facts in making a decision.423 And in 
deliberations on whether to add a name to the kill list, 
prospective voices of dissent from Treasury or State, if they exist, 
are likely to be overwhelmed by the others’.424 
Indeed, the separation of functions in a multi-stage process 
involving intelligence gathering can actually create new 
pro-regulatory incentives. Those who ultimately approve targets 
and those who conduct the targeting operations must make 
life-and-death decisions based on intelligence they did not gather 
and are not well-positioned to evaluate.425 They face strong 
incentives to suppress doubts about the strength of that 
intelligence.426 
                                                                                                     
 419. Grant & Keohane, supra note 1032, at 30 (emphasis added). 
 420. McNeal, supra note 25, at 693. 
 421. See id. at 728–29 (describing legal advisors and the NCTC as two of the 
more influential players in the decision-making process). 
 422. See id. at 727 (describing the NCTC’s role as scrutinizing the names 
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 423. See id. (noting that some senior level bureaucrats will abstain from 
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 424. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 86–87 (noting the unanimity of views 
among bureaucrats in the Defense and State Departments). 
 425. See SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 99 (observing that the process is “highly 
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 426. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 86–87 (describing an expectation that 
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B.  Review Mechanisms and Doctrinal Changes 
The establishment of a review mechanism is another way 
incentives to over-regulate could potentially be dampened, by 
requiring the agencies involved in the targeted killing process to 
be held accountable for decision-making and its results. 
Numerous proposals have been made, including some form of 
judicial,427 inter-agency,428 congressional,429 or intra-agency 
review.430  
A truly independent review mechanism could have value, but 
not necessarily in the way these reform proposals suggest.431 It is 
important, of course, to promote accountability, compliance with 
rules, and genuine deliberation.432 But the greatest value of these 
mechanisms as applied to national security activities lies in the 
brute anti-regulatory pressure they exert on over-regulating 
bureaucrats.433  
                                                                                                     
 427. See, e.g., Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and 
Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 440, 446 (2009) 
(proposing Bivens-style judicial review of targeting operations); Stephen 
Vladeck, Targeted Killing and Judicial Review, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
ARGUENDO 11, 26 (2014) (proposing, as the “least-worst [procedural] solution,” 
an ex post judicial remedy created by Congress similar to the cause of action 
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act). 
 428. See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal, Opinion, Who Will Mind the Drones?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2013, at A27 (proposing a review panel made up primarily of 
national security advisors). 
 429. Cf. McNeal, supra note 25, at 790 (proposing that Congress create  
an independent review board . . . [appointed] by the minority and 
majority leadership of the House and Senate . . . drawn from the 
ranks of former intelligence and military officers . . . [and] responsible 
for publishing an annual report analyzing how well the government's 
targeted killing program is performing. 
 430. See Crandall, If You Can’t Beat Them, Kill Them: Complex Adaptive 
Systems Theory and the Rise in Targeted Killing, supra note 73, at 626 
(proposing the use of CSRT-type proceedings); see also Radsan & Murphy, supra 
note 38, at 1230 (proposing an internal review process within the CIA for its 
targeting operations); see also Craig, supra note 209, at 2353 (listing recent 
proposals to reform the targeted killing process). 
 431. See Radsan & Murphy, supra note 38, at 1208 (suggesting independent 
reviews that are “as public as national security permits”).  
 432. Id.  
 433. Supra notes 427–430 and accompanying text.  
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Given the incentives that drive agency, presidential, and 
congressional decision-making in the national security realm,434 it 
is unlikely that more frequent congressional or intra-agency 
review would exert anti-regulatory pressure on those agencies 
conducting targeted killing operations. As discussed above, 
interagency review—which already exists—is unlikely to be 
successful unless the reviewing agency has both a different 
mission than the agencies conducting targeting operations and 
the resources and expertise to evaluate targeting decisions.435 No 
such agency currently exists,436 but an OIRA437-type entity 
empowered to review national security bureaucratic decision-
making—at least the rules that govern targeting decisions and 
their costs and benefits, if not the individualized 
determinations—could potentially alter bureaucratic behavior if 
it employed a strong cost-benefit analysis requirement borrowed 
from Executive Order 12,866.438 OIRA review was conceived as an 
anti-regulatory device, and has in fact slowed down the pace of 
rulemaking in the domestic context.439 
The Executive Order requires agencies to submit proposed 
rules to OIRA and include a cost-benefit analysis of the rule.440 
                                                                                                     
 434. See supra Part III.B (listing the key players in the drone decision-
making process). 
 435. Supra note 36 and accompanying text.  
 436. See Rascoff, supra note 70, at 657–58 (noting that “quasi-independent” 
intelligence oversight boards lack resources and are riven by political 
disagreements). See generally Schlanger, supra note 21, at 166. 
 437. Executive Order 12,866, which establishes, over all U.S. government 
agency rulemaking, centralized review by the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
echoes the APA by exempting “[r]egulations or rules that pertain to a military or 
foreign affairs function of the United States, other than procurement 
regulations.” Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993), reprinted as 
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012). 
 438. See Rascoff, supra note 70, at 674 (discussing the potential 
effectiveness of OIRA-type review of intelligence-gathering). See generally Exec. 
Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
(2012). 
 439. See generally Bagley & Revesz, supra note 300 (analyzing the 
centralized review of agency rulemaking resulting from a mistaken assumption 
that domestic agencies tend to overregulate). 
 440. Supra note 437, § 3(f).  
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For “significant regulatory actions,” however, the Executive 
Order requires much more. The agency must submit not only a 
cost-benefit analysis of the proposed action, but it also must 
consider and provide cost-benefit analyses of “potentially effective 
and reasonably feasible alternatives to the proposed action,” 
including taking no regulatory action at all.441 In the targeted 
killing context, the application of these principles would require 
the drone bureaucracy to consider, and demonstrate to the 
reviewing body that it had in fact considered, the benefits of 
taking no action, other means of neutralizing a proposed target, 
including capture, and the intelligence value that the target could 
provide if detained and interrogated.442 
Judicial review of targeting decisions—either ex ante or ex 
post—has strong anti-regulatory potential, even in the national 
security realm.443 But aside from the military detention context, 
the judiciary’s capacity to influence regulation by the national 
security bureaucracy has been overshadowed by its reluctance to 
do so.444 The courts have so far rejected plaintiffs’ attempts to 
introduce judicial scrutiny into the targeting process either ex 
ante or ex post: they have declined to review kill list nominations 
or consider claims for damages after a strike.445 
                                                                                                     
 441. Id. § 6(a). 
 442. According to the Drone Playbook, these factors are already part of the 
interagency process for targeted killing nominations and approval. Drone 
Playbook, supra note 25, §§ 1C, 2, 3B. See also McNeal, supra note 25, at 701, 
730 (confirming this from interviews). But there are reasons to doubt how 
seriously, in practice, the detention option is considered. See SCAHILL, supra 
note 25, at 63 (noting that the  
slide illustrating the chain of approval makes no mention of 
evaluating option for capture. It may be implied that those 
discussions are part of the target development process, but the 
omission reflects the brute facts beneath the Obama administration’s 
state preference for capture” and that “detention of marked targets is 
now incredibly rare. 
 443. Supra Part II.C. 
 444. See Craig, supra note 209, at 2364–68 (expressing skepticism about the 
effectiveness of judicial review of targeting decisions in light of the highly 
deferential approach to Guantanamo habeas cases in the D.C. Circuit); Jenny S. 
Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
1013, 1017 (2008) (observing that U.S. courts’ involvement in national security 
cases has focused heavily on procedural issues “at a human cost”). 
 445. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2010) (rejecting—
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As a way of addressing concerns about Article III courts 
lacking the competence or willingness to evaluate targeted killing 
decisions, scholars have proposed that a special court or 
quasi-adjudicative body be established to take on the task.446 
Whatever the forum, however, altering bureaucratic behavior 
requires that the reviewing body impose greater scrutiny on the 
decision-making process.447 As in the criminal justice context,448 
review of targeted killing decisions would have a greater chance 
of altering bureaucratic behavior if it applied administrative law 
principles, such as hard look, that are recognized as having an 
anti-regulatory effect. Courts use the hard-look doctrine to test 
the legitimacy of agency action by scrutinizing the agency’s 
reasoning—asking whether there is a rational connection 
between the facts found and the policy choice made.449  
However, given the frequent use of post-hoc intelligence 
gathering to justify strikes, reviewing bodies should do more. The 
hard-look doctrine works best when paired with a second 
principle, the Chenery doctrine.450 Chenery requires that an 
                                                                                                     
on standing, political question, and other justiciability grounds—a challenge to 
the nomination of a U.S. citizen to the “kill list” without first allowing the 
plaintiff any judicial process); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 
F.3d 836, 837–38 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (upholding dismissal, on political question 
grounds, of a suit by owners of a Sudanese pharmaceutical destroyed in a 
targeting operation for “unjustifiably destroying the plant, failing to compensate 
them for its destruction, and defaming them by asserting they had ties to 
Osama bin Laden”). 
 446. See Craig, supra note 209, at 2378–83 (discussing proposals). 
 447. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons 
from Administrative Law, supra note 405, at 893–94. 
 448. Id. at 871. 
 449. The APA requires reviewing courts to “hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) 
(1947). The Supreme Court has interpreted “arbitrary and capricious” review as 
requiring courts to review the record and “satisfy themselves that the agency 
has made a reasoned decision based on its evaluation of the significance—or 
lack of significance—of . . . information.” Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council, 490 
U.S. 360, 378 (1989). “Hard look” review describes the way the courts enforce 
the “arbitrary and capricious” standard, so the terms are usually considered 
interchangeable. See generally Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics 
in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2009). 
 450. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94–95 (1943). 
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agency defend its policy only on the grounds articulated by the 
agency when the policy was developed.451 The hard-look Chenery 
combination would prevent the drone bureaucracy from seeking 
post-hoc justifications for strikes that killed disproportionate 
numbers of civilians or failed to kill the enemy at all.452  
Like OIRA review, Chenery and hard-look have been 
criticized for having an anti-regulatory bias and imposing 
significant costs on agency decision-making.453 However, what is 
viewed by many as a liability in the domestic context becomes an 
asset in the national security context.454 Because the power 
dynamics and incentives push the drone bureaucracy to over-
regulate—to conduct too many strikes based on insufficient 
intelligence—doctrines that impose more regulatory costs on the 
drone bureaucracy are necessary to push it back toward the 
optimal level of regulation.455 
C.  Political Pressure 
As I discussed above, national security bureaucrats face 
relatively little political pressure, under ordinary circumstances, 
to reduce the level of regulation. Their greatest concern, in fact, is 
that the public and Congress will view them as 
                                                                                                     
 451. Id.; see, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of 
Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 958–59 (2007) (“[A] reviewing court may uphold an 
agency’s action only on the grounds upon which the agency relied when it 
acted.”). 
 452. Supra notes 364–365 and accompanying text. Professors Radsan and 
Murphy have proposed the application of these principles to internal review of 
CIA drones strikes. See generally Radsan & Murphy, supra note 38, at 1234. 
However, for reasons discussed above, use of these principles in an internal 
review process is unlikely to have a meaningful anti-regulatory effect given the 
CIA’s institutional mission and bureaucratic incentives. Supra notes 310–330 
and accompanying text. 
 453. See, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign Hard Look Review, 66 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 489, 501 (2014) (discussing the popularity of the idea “that hard look 
review had contributed to a slowing, even ‘ossification,’ of agency action”). 
 454. Id. at 513. 
 455. Cf. Laurence Tai, Harnessing Industry Influence, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 1 
(2016) (proposing that capture may be “harnessed” by “making regulation 
preliminarily biased against industry, with the aim of ultimately unbiased 
policy as industry influences policy to cancel out the initial bias”). 
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underregulating.456 Nonetheless, the same trends that have made 
the warfare-as-regulation paradigm viable—the expanding scope 
of national security activities, the changing nature of warfare, 
and the declining half-life of secrets457—also create new 
possibilities for exerting anti-regulatory political pressure on the 
national security bureaucracy. 
The Snowden revelations demonstrated that there exists a 
genuine potential for domestic public backlash against 
overregulation by the national security state.458 Although public 
support for NSA surveillance actually spiked immediately after 
the Snowden revelations, support slowly ebbed as the public 
absorbed the details about the scope and intrusiveness of the 
surveillance.459 Similarly, in January 2017 an aggressively 
implemented executive order banning entry for non-citizens from 
seven Muslim-majority countries led to public outrage, 
demonstrations at airports throughout the United States, and 
swift judicial intervention to block it.460 In addition, the public 
has periodically demonstrated concern about overspending and 
inefficiency in the national security state.461 More transparency 
                                                                                                     
 456. Supra notes 329–330 and accompanying text. 
 457. See supra Part II (discussing the trends that make the 
warfare-as-regulation paradigm a useful project). 
 458. See Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Ex-Worker at C.I.A. Says He 
Leaked Data on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2013, at A1 (examining 
Snowden’s leak of large amounts of classified information, and the reaction the 
leaks caused in Washington); Rascoff, supra note 70, at 642 (discussing how the 
Snowden leaks caused the President to reshape his outlook on intelligence 
gathering).  
 459. See Dalal, supra note 99, at 113 (detailing the public outrage after the 
Snowden scandal). 
 460. See Colin Dwyer, Of Courts And Confusion: Here's The Reaction To 
Trump’s Immigration Freeze, NPR (Jan. 29, 2017, 9:17 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/01/29/512272524/of-courts-and-
confusion-heres-the-reaction-to-trumps-immigration-freeze (last visited Nov. 13, 
2017) (describing the protests and political backlash that occurred after Trump’s 
immigration freeze); Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(per curiam) (denying the U.S. government’s emergency motion for stay pending 
appeal of the district court’s nationwide injunction halting enforcement of 
Trump’s executive order banning entry into the United States of individuals 
from seven Muslim-majority countries). 
 461. See Jeanne Sahadi, Why Debt is a Threat to the National Security, CNN 
(October 22, 2012, 11:24 PM), 
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about the costs of the drone program could create pressure to 
scale back its scope.462 
However, perhaps the most underappreciated opportunities 
for domestic anti-regulatory pressure involve the private firms 
that the national security state depends on to regulate. As I 
discussed above, private firms have traditionally shared the 
national security bureaucrat’s pro-regulatory incentives, which 
the profit motive tends to enhance.463 Nonetheless, the profit 
motive can exert anti-regulatory pressure, too. This is most likely 
to happen when a firm supplies both the national security 
bureaucracy and the consumer market, and when its national 
security activities are exposed to public scrutiny.464 The Snowden 
revelations caused previously quiescent telecommunications and 
high technology companies to be less cooperative in collection 
activities and to begin lobbying the President and Congress to 
scale back the scope of NSA surveillance.465 
Intelligence collection is a significant component of the 
targeted killing process, so U.S. consumer pressure on the private 
firms that assist in the collection process could, or perhaps 
already has, produce anti-regulatory effects.466 But, 
anti-regulatory pressure could also result from the expansion of 
                                                                                                     
http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/22/news/economy/national-security-
debt/index.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) (“The concern: If the debt continues 
to grow unbridled, the U.S. government will be constrained in its ability to pay 
for what it wants to do militarily and diplomatically.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 462. See McNeal, supra note 25, at 788 (noting that publishing the costs 
associated with government activity is a proven accountability technique). 
 463. See supra notes 292–325 and accompanying text (discussing private 
contractors’ incentives when working with national security bureaucrats). 
 464. See Rascoff, supra note 70, at 662 (describing the shift in technology 
firms’ regulatory incentives after the Snowden revelations because of the firms’ 
worry about the “reputational and economic harms that could result from being 
identified with the putative misdeeds of the NSA”).  
 465. See Rascoff, supra note 70, at 660–66 (detailing the ways in which the 
Snowden revelations changed the incentives of technology companies). 
 466. See Michael R. Siebecker, Bridging Troubled Waters: Linking Corporate 
Efficiency and Political Legitimacy Through a Discourse Theory of the Firm, 75 
OHIO ST. L.J. 103, 104–05 (2014) (demonstrating how investor, shareholder, and 
consumer concerns can affect a company’s corporate governance actions).  
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the drone market to the domestic realm.467 Firms that supply 
drones to the military and law enforcement will also be supplying 
a significant chunk of the sales and maintenance for commercial 
and private use.468 This fundamentally alters these private firms’ 
incentives and increases their power while reducing the 
government’s.469 Moreover, like voracious personal data 
collection, when drones are a ubiquitous tool for not only warfare, 
but also commercial and personal use, it will be easier for the 
public to see the costs they impose.470  
The potential for increased anti-regulatory pressure extends 
to the global level, from both private firms and foreign 
governments.471 As a dominant military and economic power, the 
                                                                                                     
 467. See Troy A. Rule, Drone Zoning, 95 N.C. L. REV. 133, 137–38 (2016) 
(describing the civilian drone industry as serving “one of the most rapidly 
expanding markets in the world” and noting that the markets “for both 
recreational and commercial drones are expanding at breakneck pace”); 
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(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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 470. See The Future of Unmanned Aviation in the U.S. Economy: Safety and 
Privacy Considerations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and 
Transp., 113th Cong. 24–25 (2014) (statement of Christopher Calabrese, 
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concerns, potential privacy invasions from domestic drone use); Rule, supra note 
467, at 137–39 (highlighting the growth of the civilian drone industry, and its 
effects on the growing number of conflicts between drone operators and 
landowners); INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS & CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC, supra note 
289, at 77–79 (describing how surveillance by drones caused property damage 
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 471. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 102, at 37 (listing peer accountability 
and public reputational accountability as two means of regulatory accountability 
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U.S. remains largely resistant to many forms of global 
accountability for its activities.472 But the potential cleavages 
between military contractors and the national security 
bureaucrats could play out internationally: those firms supply 
drone equipment to other governments and will also supply them 
for non-military uses worldwide.473 
In addition, U.S. government policy can be affected by 
reputational concerns and pressure from foreign governments.474 
Some U.S. allies have refused to extradite accused terrorists to 
the U.S. in light of the revelations about abusive interrogation 
practices during the Bush Administration and due process flaws 
in the military commissions at Guantanamo.475 Moreover, the 
U.S. national security state’s intelligence collection activities 
extend, not only to foreign citizens, but to their governments as 
well—including the governments of influential allies.476 
Revelations about surveillance of European allied governments 
pressured the Obama Administration to scale back its 
surveillance, and even its human intelligence gathering, in 
Europe.477 Some foreign governments have even avoided U.S. 
technology firms when awarding important contracts due to 
                                                                                                     
mechanisms). 
 472. See id. at 39 (observing that because “large and powerful states” like 
the U.S. “do not depend on subventions from others or on markets, and there is 
no strong international legal structure governing their actions . . . such states 
often resist international legal accountability”). 
 473.  See id. at 37 (“Overlapping . . . interest areas may require actors to 
compromise with one another to secure the cooperation necessary to define or 
implement policy.”). 
 474. See id. (describing accountability that arises as a result of reputational 
concerns and peer pressure).  
 475. See Background on Guantanamo Bay Prison, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST 
(Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/background-
guantanamo-bay-prison (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) (“Because of the 
questionable legitimacy of the Guantanamo military commissions and the 
human rights concerns over indefinite detention at the prison, countries have 
refused to extradite terrorism suspects to the United States . . . .”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 476. See Rascoff, supra note 70, at 665–66 (discussing pushback from 
European allies on U.S. surveillance practices, including surveillance of heads of 
state).  
 477. See id. (discussing pushback from European allies on U.S. surveillance 
practices). 
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concerns about the firms’ cooperation in U.S. surveillance.478 This 
has thrown those firms’ and the national security bureaucrats’ 
incentives further out of alignment.479 
Finally, it is possible that changing political dynamics and 
the costs of drone strikes could cause the governments in the 
countries where targeting occurs to exert significant anti-
regulatory pressure. After botched operations in 2014, the Yemen 
government temporarily withdrew permission for further drone 
attacks.480 Again in February 2017, Yemen withdrew permission 
for further U.S. ground operations in the country after a U.S. raid 
killed a number of civilians.481  
In the end, there is no single solution to the massive power 
imbalance in favor of pro-regulatory forces in the targeted killing 
process and in national security regulating in general. What is 
most likely to be effective in addressing this power imbalance is a 
combination of anti-regulatory pressures: the willingness of an 
independent review body to apply the same scrutiny to national 
security regulating that it applies to domestic regulation, 
consumer activism aimed at private firms, and retaliation from 
foreign governments. These efforts, alongside the efforts by NGOs 
to force transparency about targeted killing and the efforts, can 
reinforce one another in the same way that pro-regulatory forces 
have. 
VI. Conclusion 
The national security state occupies a central role in 
American governance. Its interventions in the private lives of 
both citizens and non-citizens will only grow as the boundaries 
                                                                                                     
 478. See id. at 663 (observing how the recent Snowden revelations caused 
the German government to transfer an important contract from Verizon to 
Duetsche Telecom). 
 479. See id. at 664 (detailing how American firms have “taken a stance 
against ‘overregulation’ by the intelligence state”). 
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between the foreign and domestic realms, and between military 
and law enforcement functions, continue to erode.  
Yet state’s activities have been viewed, for too long, as 
existing somehow outside the bureaucracy that regulates 
American life. The national security state is treated as the war 
machine—a leviathan, which advocates of stronger rights-
protective legal regimes seek to reign in, to oversee, and to 
regulate. Advocates of rights-focused legal regimes have been 
effective in many ways, but without a model of how national 
security bureaucrats actually regulate, analyses of those 
bureaucrats’ activities are incomplete and may misidentify the 
source of key problems. 
This Article begins the project of modeling national security 
activities as regulation. This model is a simple one and can and 
should be complicated by future assessments that move beyond 
classic public choice assumptions and address other specific 
national security activities. However, this model does reveal that 
the most important driver of agency behavior in the national 
security state—in the targeted killing context, at least—are 
bureaucrats’ incentives. From this insight it follows that the most 
effective means of influencing the regulating national security 
bureaucracy is to find ways to alter bureaucrats’ incentives. This 
is a promising place for reformers to focus their attention. 
